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INTRODUCTION

T

HE PRO-ANTITRUST BIAS OF THE WARREN COURT led
Justice Stewart to state in 1966 that, in litigation arising under
section 7 of the Clayton Act (section 7),' "the sole consistency that I
can find is that ... the Government always wins."' 2 With the
emergence of a new Court, however, the pro-antitrust tendency has
ended and a decidedly anti-antitrust bias has appeared. Of the
eleven major antitrust cases decided by the Burger Court in the
course of its 1973 and 1974 terms, 3 five involved mergers or
acquisitions challenged under section 7.4 These decisions indicate
the emergence of an anti-antitrust bias. This article examines the
impact of the shift in judicial bias by tracing the development of the
law of mergers under both the Warren and Burger Courts.
Part II begins with a discussion of the 1948 case of United States
v. Columbia Steel Co.,' in order to present the philosophy of the
Supreme Court toward mergers before the Warren Court era.
t Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; A.B., West Virginia
University, 1960; J.D., University of Michigan, 1963.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). For the pertinent text of this section, see note 68 infra.
2. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See Solomon, Why Uncle Sam Can't Lose a Case Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 53 A.B.A.J. 137, 140-41 (1967).
3. United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Gordon v.
New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. American Bldg.
Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975); United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
422 U.S. 86 (1975); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, rehearingdenied, 423
U.S. 886 (1975); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616, rehearingdenied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975); United States v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186
(1974); United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v.
Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486 (1974).
4. See United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975);
United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974); United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974);
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). For a general history of
Supreme Court merger cases between 1962 and 1974, see Note, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW
693 (1975).
5. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).

(213)
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Columbia Steel articulated a "rule of reason" 6 approach to mergers
and acquisitions which, as the article demonstrates, was dismantled
bit by bit in case after case by the Warren Court. Adopting what was
termed a "simplified test of illegality, '7 the Warren Court lessened
the burden of proving an unlawful merger or acquisition to a point
just short of declaring that all mergers or acquisitions, except those
of de minimis proportions were per se illegal.
The few cases that were decided during the transition period
between the appointment of Warren Burger to replace Earl Warren
as Chief Justice and the domination of the Court by the new
antitrust majority are surveyed briefly in Part III of this article.
Part IV details the Burger Court's dismantling of the "simplified
test of illegality" of the Warren Court, and follows the resurrection of
the rule of reason approach to mergers and acquisitions. No longer
would a merger or acquisition be invalidated on the basis of a
predicted anticompetitive impact; apparently, nothing short of proof
of a present anticompetitive effect would be sufficient to meet the
"lessen competition" standard of section 7.8
Also illustrated in Part IV are the reasons supporting this
author's conclusion that the Burger majority harbors an antiantitrust bias. In the cases discussed, the article further suggests
that the Court has discarded precedent and strained statutory
language and legislative history in an effort to avoid finding a
section 7 violation.
The implications of the Burger Court's anti-antitrust bias are
found in Part V. The author predicts the ascendancy of the rule of
reason in future antitrust cases of every variety with the result that
reliance upon the per se rule will be reserved only for blatant
restraints of trade, such as horizontal price fixing. The author notes
that the utilization of a per se rule for vertical resale restrictions 9
was the first casualty of the Burger Court's return to the rule of
reason approach, and finds language in the Court's reasoning that
evidences a willingness to rescind the per se rule in the area of
horizontal resale restrictions as well. The article also discusses the
Burger Court's erosion of a per se rule of illegality for tying
arrangements. 10 Finally, the likelihood of retrenchment in the areas

6. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 124-27 infra.
8. See notes 252-59 & 277-89 and accompanying text infra.
9. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). For a
discussion of this case, see notes 494-507 and accompanying text infra.
10. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 861 (1977)
(FortnerHI). For a discussion of Fortner II, see notes 569-72 and accompanying text
infra.
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of resale price maintenance and exchange of price information
among competitors is considered briefly."

II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF MERGERS

A.

In the Beginning: The Rule of Reason

The modern law of mergers and acquisitions under section 7 had
its genesis in the Warren Court. Nevertheless, that Court's treatment
of section 7 cases may best be understood by examining the
philosophy of the previous Court, which had rejected the notion that
1 2
"bigness is bad."
As originally enacted,' 3 section 7 proscribed only corporate stock

acquisitions where the effect of the acquisition might be "to
substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose
stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or
to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to
create a monopoly of any line of commerce."1 4

Assets acquisitions were not covered by section 7.15 Thus, when
the United States sought to enjoin the acquisition of Consolidated
Steel Corporation by United States Steel Corporation in United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 16 the Government alleged that sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act' 7 had been violated.' 8 The case
contained both horizontal1 9 and vertical 2° aspects. With respect to
the horizontal issue in the case, the Government relied upon four
11. See notes 520-46 and accompanying text infra.
12. See generally L. D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (1934). See also text
accompanying note 38 infra.
13. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976)).
14. Id.
15. For a discussion of the subsequent amendment to § 7 to include assets
acquisitions, see notes 66-69 and accompanying text infra.
16. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). Section 1 of the Sherman Act currently provides in
pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. § 1. Similarly, § 2 provides in pertinent
part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a felony ....
" Id. § 2. At the time of Columbia Steel, violation of these sections
constituted only a misdemeanor. See 334 U.S. at 498 n.1.
18. 334 U.S. at 498.
19. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). In Brown Shoe, the
Court stated: "An economic arrangement between companies performing similar
functions in the production or sale of comparable goods or services is characterized as
'horizontal.' " Id. at 334.
20. See id. at 323. The Brown Shoe Court defined vertical relationships as
"[e]conomic arrangements between companies standing in a supplier-customer
relationship ....
" Id.
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railroad cases 21 to argue that a merger between competitors such as
Consolidated and the subsidiaries of U.S. Steel would unreasonably
restrain trade within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act by
automatically eliminating competition, at least between the parties
themselves. 22 In asserting that "control by one competitor over
another violates the Sherman Act even though the percentage of
business for which they compete may be small, ' 23 the Government
was, in effect, alleging that U.S. Steel's purchase of the assets of
Consolidated was unlawful per se. As to the vertical aspect of
Columbia Steel, the Government contended that the acquisition in
question was invalid per se since it excluded all steel manufacturers
except the acquiring company - U.S. Steel - from supplying the
24
acquired company - Consolidated - with its steel requirements.

The Supreme Court majority, however, was of a different
philosophical bent. In a 5-4 decision, 25 the Court held that the
acquisition violated neither section 1 nor section 2 of the Sherman
Act.2 6 The Government's argument on the unlawfulness of the
vertical stage of the acquisition was rejected by the Court for two
reasons. First, there was no indication that the acquisition had the
effect of unreasonably restricting the ability of competitors to
market steel. 27 Moreover, there was no evidence of a specific intent to
create an unreasonable restraint in the industry. 28 The Court then
turned to the horizontal aspect of the acquisition and noted:
The same tests which measure the legality of vertical integration
by acquisition are also applicable to the acquisition of competitors in identical or similar lines of merchandise. .

.

.If such

acquisition results in or is aimed at unreasonable restraint, then
the purchase is forbidden by the Sherman Act. In determining
21. United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); United States v.
Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912);
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); see 334 U.S. at 531 & n.27.
22. 334 U.S. at 507, 531.

23. Id. at 531.
24. Id. at 507, 519.
25. Justice Reed wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Vinson, and
Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton joined, while Justice Douglas wrote a
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Black, Murphy, and Rutledge.
26. Id. at 508.
27. Id. at 526-27. The Court recognized its inability to engage in the line drawing
necessary to conclude that the instant acquisition constituted a per se antitrust

violation:
It is not for the courts to determine the course of the Nation's economic
development . . . .[N]o direction has appeared of a public policy that forbids, per
se, an expansion of facilities of an existing company to meet the needs of new

markets

.

.

If businesses are to be forbidden from entering into different

stages of production that order must come from Congress, not the courts.

Id. at 526.
28. Id. at 527, 531-34.
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what constitutes unreasonable restraint, we do not think the
dollar volume is in itself of compelling significance; we look
rather to the percentage of business controlled, the strength of
the remaining competition, whether the action springs from
business requirements or purpose to monopolize, the probable
development of the industry, consumer demands, and other
characteristics of the market. We do not undertake to prescribe
any set of percentage figures by which to measure the
reasonablenessof a corporation'senlargement of its activities by
the purchase of the assets of a competitor. The relative effect of
percentage command of a market varies with the setting in
which that factor is placed.29
The Court concluded that, under the standard announced, the
Government had failed to prove that the elimination of competition
between Consolidated and the subsidiaries of U.S. Steel constituted
an unreasonable restraint of trade. 30 The majority also dismissed the
Government's reliance upon the four railroad cases, 31 stating:
We do not stop to examine those cases to determine whether we
would now approve either their language or their holdings. The
factual situation in all those cases is so dissimilar from that presented here that they furnish little guidance in determining
whether the competition which will be eliminated through the
purchase of Consolidated is sufficient
to warrant injunctive
32
relief requested by the government.
Thus, the Court's philosophy was clear: mergers and acquisitions were not to be examined for legality by any simple formula, but
by the rule of reason. 3 Only if, in the judgment of the Court, after an
examination of all of the facts and circumstances, 34 the merger or
acquisition was likely to restrain trade substantially would it be held
35
to violate section 1.

B.

The Emerging Philosophy of "The Curse of Bigness"

Justice Douglas' dissent in Columbia Steel soon replaced the
majority opinion as the dominant philosophy of the Court 3 and the
29. Id. at 527-28 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 529.
31. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
32. 334 U.S. at 531.
33. Id. at 527. The "rule of reason" standard was defined by the Court as follows:
"If [the] acquisition results in or is aimed at unreasonable restraint, then the purchase
is forbidden by the Sherman Act." Id.
34. Id.; see text accompanying note 29 supra.
35. 334 U.S. at 527.
36. See notes 38-218 and accompanying text infra.
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judicial attitude embodied in the Columbia Steel majority opinion
7
remained in disfavor until the establishment of the Burger Court
According to Justice Douglas:
We have here the problem of bigness. Its lesson should by now
have been burned into our memory by Brandeis. The Curse of
Bigness shows how size can become a menace - both industrial
and social. It can be an industrial menace because it creates
gross inequalities against existing or putative competitors. It
can be a social menace - because of its control of prices. Control
of prices in the steel industry is powerful leverage in our
economy. For the price of steel determines the price of hundreds
of other articles. Our price level determines in large measure
whether we have prosperity or depression - an economy of
abundance or scarcity. Size in steel should therefore be jealously
watched. In final analysis, size in steel is the measure of the
power of a handful of men over our economy. That power can be
utilized with lightning speed. It can be benign or it can be
dangerous. The philosophy of the Sherman Act is that it should
not exist. For all power tends to develop into a government in
itself. Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of
elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an
industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized. It
should be scattered into many hands, so that the fortunes of the
people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political
prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men.
The fact that they are not vicious men but respectable and
social-minded is irrelevant. That is the philosophy and the
command of the Sherman Act. It is founded on a theory of
hostility to the concentration in private hands of power so great
3
that only a government of the people should have it. 8
In spite of its defeat in Columbia Steel, the next year the
Government initiated a suit against another large corporation. The
1917 purchase by E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. (duPont) of a
twenty-three percent stock interest in General Motors Corporation
(GM) was challenged under section 7 .39 The Government argued that
37. See notes 236-471 and accompanying text infra.
38. 334 U.S. at 535-36 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted); see note 12
and accompanying text supra.
39. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235, 237, 241
(N.D. Ill. 1954), rev'd, 353 U.S. 586 (1957). The district court dismissed the complaint
because the record, when viewed as a whole, did not demonstrate that duPont "did
restrain or intended to, or had the effect of, restraining or monopolizing trade and
commerce." 126 F. Supp. at 334-35. The Government then took a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court under § 2 of the Expediting Act, ch. 646, § 17, 62 Stat. 989 (1948)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1976)). See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588 & n.1 (1957).
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the stock acquisition enabled duPont to become GM's largest
supplier of automobile finishes and fabrics.40 The Supreme Court did
not decide United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.41 until
1957 when the composition of the Court was significantly different
from that of 1948, when Columbia Steel had been decided. 42 Through
its treatment of four major issues, the duPont case illustrates the
seeds of a philosophy that would bring the Court, in little more than
10 years, to the very brink of adopting a per se rule for mergers and
43
acquisitions.
The applicability of section 744 to vertical acquisitions was the
first issue which the duPont Court faced. 45 During the previous
thirty-five years of litigation under the Clayton Act, the Government
had not invoked section 7 against vertical acquisitions.4 6 Moreover,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)4 7 had said specifically that the
section did not apply to them. 48 The uncertainty as to the scope of
section 7 resulted from its prohibition of stock acquisitions where the
effect of the acquisition tended to "lessen competition between the
corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making
the acquisition."4 9 Since the parties to a vertical acquisition do not
compete, 5° the acquisition cannot lessen competition between them.
51
Therefore, it was felt by many that section 7 was not applicable.
However, the duPont Court concluded that section 7 did apply to
vertical acquisitions because that section proscribed not only stock
40. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588-89 (1957).
41. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
42. Columbia Steel was decided by Justices Vinson, Black, Reed, Frankfurter,
Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge, and Burton. Only Justices Black, Frankfurter,
Douglas, and Burton were still sitting when duPont was decided in 1957. Justices
Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker took no part in the consideration of the duPont case.
353 U.S. at 608.
43. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v.
Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
376 U.S. 651 (1964). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 166-93 and
accompanying text infra.
44. Section 7 was amended between the time suit was instituted and the Supreme
Court's disposition in duPont. For a discussion of the amendments to § 7 in 1950, see
notes 66-69 and accompanying text infra. However, the case was decided under § 7 as
it read at the time of the events leading up to the suit. See notes 39-40 and
accompanying text supra.
45. 353 U.S. at 590.
46. See id.
47. Section 11(a) of the Clayton Act gives the FTC authority to enforce
compliance with various sections of the antitrust laws, including § 7. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a)
(1976).
48. See 353 U.S. at 590, citing FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON CORPORATE
MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 168, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1955).
49. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976)); see text accompanying note 14 supra.
50. See note 20 supra.
51. See 353 U.S. at 590, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1949).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23: p. 213

acquisitions having the effect of lessening competition between the
acquired and acquiring corporations, but also those acquisitions
"where the effect may be either (1) to restrain commerce in any
section or community, or (2) tend to create a monopoly of any line of
commerce. ' 52 The thirty-five years of governmental failure to utilize
section 7 against vertical acquisitions was dismissed with the
statement that "[t]he failure of the [Federal Trade] Commission to
act is not a binding administrative interpretation that Congress did
not intend vertical acquisitions to come within the purview of the
53
[Clayton] Act."
The duPont case also raised the question of whether section 7
applied "only to the acquisition of stock and not to the holding or
subsequent use of the stock. ' 5 1 The stock in this case had been
purchased thirty years prior to the Government's suit, and it was
clear that at the time of the purchase the required adverse effect
could not have been established. 55 Thus, the defendants argued that
5
section 7 was applicable only to the acquisition of the stock.
However, the Court held to the contrary, stating:
This argument misconceives the objective toward which § 7 is
directed. The Clayton Act was intended to supplement the
Sherman Act. Its aim was primarily to arrest apprehended
consequences of intercorporate relationships before those relationships could work their evil, which may be at or any time
after the acquisition, depending upon the circumstances of the
particular case....
* ' * To accomplish the congressional aim, the Government
may proceed at any time that an acquisition may be said with
reasonable probability to contain a threat that it may lead to a
restraint of commerce or tend to create a monopoly of a line of
57
commerce.
A third issue in duPont concerned the definition of the relevant
product market within which the alleged adverse effects were to be
measured. 58 The Court easily found that the market was to include
52. 353 U.S. at 591.
53. Id. at 590. It should be noted that the duPont Court's curt dismissal of this
issue is sharply distinguishable from the Burger Court's subsequent position on the
interpretation of governmental inaction in United States v. American Bldg.
Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975). For a discussion of this point, see text
accompanying notes 454-55 infra.
54. 353 U.S. at 596-97.
55. Id. at 598, citing United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp.
235, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1954); see text accompanying note 39 supra.
56. 353 U.S. at 596-97.
57. Id. at 597-98 (footnotes omitted).
58. Id. at 593; see text accompanying notes 85 & 86 infra.
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the narrow area of automobile finishes and fabrics, 59 making the
impact of the defendants' activities much greater than it would have
60
been had the market of all finishes and fabrics been used.
According to the Court, automobile finishes and fabrics "have
sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute them
products sufficiently distinct from all other finishes and fabrics to
make them a 'line of commerce,' within the meaning of the Clayton
Act. ' 61 It is interesting to note that the Court did not mention a
decision it had issued involving duPont only a year earlier, 62 wherein
the Court had refused to hold that cellophane constituted a relevant
product market apart from other flexible wrapping materials. 63 The
makeup of the Court had changed, and a new majority was making
new law.
Turning to the crucial issue of whether the requisite anticompetitive effect could be found, 61 the new majority saw things quite
differently than had the previous majority. To the duPont Court, the
conclusion was "inescapable" that "there is a reasonable probability
65
that the acquisition is likely to result in the condemned restraints."
C.

The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions Under Amended Section 7

In 1950 Congress amended section 7.66 The amendment closed
the assets acquisitions loophole 67 for acquisitions by corporations
subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC 68 and made it clear that the
section was applicable to vertical acquisitions. 69 It was not until
1962, however, after Earl Warren had become the Chief Justice, that
59. 353 U.S. at 593-95; see text accompanying notes 39 & 40 supra.
60. See 353 U.S. at 593. The market of all fabrics and finishes had been suggested
by the defendants as the relevant product market. Id.
61. Id. at 593-94 (footnote omitted).
62. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
63. Id. at 400.
64. 353 U.S. at 607.
65. Id. The Court went on to state: "The fire that was kindled in 1917 [the date of
the stock acquisition] continues to smolder. It burned briskly to forge the ties that
bind the General Motors market to duPont, and if it has quieted down, it remains hot,
and, from past performance, is likely at any time to blaze and make the fusion
complete." Id.
66. Clayton Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976)).
67. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
68. See Clayton Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). Section 7 as amended reads in
pertinent part:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporationsubject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Id. (emphasis added).
69. See note 68 supra. See also text accompanying notes 45-53 supra.
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the first challenge under the amended section 7 came before the
Court. That case was Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,70 which the
Court used as a vehicle for expressing its philosophy regarding
mergers. Brown Shoe also served as the well from which later cases
71
would draw.
According to the Court in Brown Shoe, the 1950 congressional
amendment was designed to "plug the loophole" 72 that the original
section had provided for assets acquisitions, making section 7
applicable to "the acquisition of assets no less than the acquisition
of stock." 73 Moreover, the Court held that the deletion of the
language of the original text concerning the lessening of competition
between the acquiring and acquired corporations 74 indicated that the
amended section 7 was to apply not only to mergers between actual
competitors, but also to vertical and conglomerate mergers where the
effect may be a tendency to lessen competition in any line of
commerce in any section of the country. 5 Sensing the "rising tide of
economic concentration" 76 in American business, the Court concluded that Congress had sought to provide the authority "for
arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of
competition

. . .

was still in its incipiency."7 7 The Court additionally

observed that Congress had recognized that some mergers might
stimulate competition rather than impede it, and were, therefore, to
be permitted.78 Although Congress had not adopted any particular
tests for measuring relevant markets or anticompetitive effects, 79 the
Court noted that Congress had indicated that mergers should be
viewed functionally in the context of their particular industries.80
70. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
71. See, e.g., text accompanying note 127 infra.
72. 370 U.S. at 316.

73. Id.
74. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
75. 370 U.S. at 317 & nn.30 & 31; see note 68 supra.
76. 370 U.S. at 317.
77. Id. According to the Court:
Congress [had] rejected, as inappropriate to the problem it [had] sought to
remedy, the application to § 7 cases of the standards for judging the legality of
business combinations adopted by the Courts in dealing with cases arising under
the Sherman Act, and which may have been applied to some early cases arising
under original § 7.
Id. at 318.
78. Id. at 319. The Court noted:
When concern as to the [Clayton] Act's breadth was expressed, supporters of the
amendments indicated that it would not impede, for example, a merger between
two small companies to enable the combination to compete more effectively with
larger corporations dominating the relevant market, nor a merger between a
corporation which is financially healthy and a failing one which no longer can
be a vital competitive factor in the market.
Id.
79. Id. at 320-21.
80. Id. at 321-22.
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Thus, for example, the Court indicated that the degree to which the
industry is fragmented or concentrated should "be taken into
account." 8' And, according to the Court, since Congress was
with a
concerned with probabilities, not certanties, mergers
2
.
prohibited
be
to
were
effect
anticompetitive
probable
With those considerations in mind, the Brown Shoe Court
summarized the law of mergers under the amended section 7. The
Court initially noted that a merger or acquisition is unlawful only if
it results in the required anticompetitive effect.8 3 The relevant
market or arena within which the impact of the merger or
acquisition is to be measured must first be defined before a
determination of anticompetitive effect can be made.8 4 The relevant
market has two dimensions: product (line of commerce) and
geographic (section of the country).85 In discussing relevant product
markets, the Court stated:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by
the reasonable interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity of
demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.
However, within this broad market, well-defined submarkets
may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for
antitrust purposes. The boundaries of such a submarket may be
determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or
public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic
entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique
production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.86
Thus, according to Brown Shoe, the impact of a merger must be
examined in each economically significant product submarket; and,
if an anticompetitive effect is found to be a reasonable probability in
any of the markets, the merger is proscribed.8 7

81. Id. at 322. Other factors to be considered included recent trends toward
domination by a powerful few, ease of access to markets and suppliers, and ease of
entry into the industry by new competitors. Id.
82. Id. at 323.
83. Id. at 324.
84. Id. The Court in Brown Shoe stated that "'[d]etermination of the relevant
market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of the Clayton Act because
the threatened monopoly must be one which will substantially lessen competition
"within the area of effective competition." Substantiality can be determined only in
terms of the market affected.'" Id., quoting United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
85. 370 U.S. at 324.
86. Id. at 325 (footnotes and citations omitted).
87. Id.
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The Court then observed that relevant geographic markets are to
be determined by essentially similar criteria.88 There may thus be
geographic submarkets of economic significance; 9 and, if the merger
is likely to produce anticompetitive effects "in 'any' significant
market, the merger -

at least to that extent -

is proscribed." 9

Once the relevant market has been established, the Court's task
under section 7 is to determine the probable effects of the merger.9'
The character of the merger itself is one factor that may indicate
whether the effect proscribed by section 7 is likely to result. In
Brown Shoe, the Court identified the evil that is likely to result from
a vertical merger as the foreclosure of markets to competitors.9 2 The
Court cautioned, however, that, while the size of the market
foreclosure was an important consideration, it would only be
determinative where the share of the market foreclosed either
approached monopoly proportions - in which case a section 7
violation clearly would occur -

or was de minimis - in which case

there would be no violation.9 3 In cases lying between those two
extremes, the Court stated that other factors, such as the purpose of
the merger and the trend toward concentration in the industry, were
more important.9 4
In a horizontal merger, the antitrust evil that is likely to result is
the elimination of competition between the merging parties, and the
consequent lessening of competition in the industry.9 5 The Court, in
Brown Shoe thus observed that a major consideration in determining the legality of such a merger is the resulting market share that
the companies may control by merging.96 Again, however, the Court
noted that other factors, such as the trend toward concentration,
97
should be considered in evaluating the probable effects of a merger.
88. Id. at 336.
89. Id. at 337. The Court emphasized that "[t]he geographic market selected must
.. .both 'correspond to the commercial realities' of the industry and be economically
significant." Id, at 336-37, quoting American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American
Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1960).
Therefore, the Court noted, a geographic market may be as large as the entire nation
in some instances, and as small as a single metropolitan area in others. 370 U.S. at
337.
90. 370 U.S. at 337.
91. Id. at 328, 339. For a detailed discussion of the effects of the Brown Shoe
merger on retail competition, see Peterman, The Brown Shoe Case, 18 J.L. & ECON.
81, 83-106 (1975).
92. 370 U.S. at 328 (emphasis added). See Peterman, supra note 91, at 106-17. See
also note 20 supra.
93. 370 U.S. at 328-29.
94. Id. at 329-33. For a critical discussion of the Court's findings concerning the
trend toward concentration in Brown Shoe, see Peterman, supra note 91, at 117-32.
95. See 370 U.S. at 339; see note 19 supra.
96. Id. at 343; see id. at 347-53.
97. Id. at 344-46.
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It should be apparent that the Brown Shoe Court was, in effect,
establishing a set of rules under which virtually any merger that
was likely to produce some adverse consequences could be proscribed. Further, determining the likelihood of adverse consequences
was a matter resting solely within the judgment of the Court,
thereby making judicial discretion the key determinant of a section 7
violation.
D.

The "Simplified Test of Illegality":
A Presumption of Invalidity

A year after deciding Brown Shoe, the Court, in United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank9" (PNB), was confronted with a
challenge to a proposed merger between the second and third largest
commercial banks in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. 99 At the
outset, the Court was faced with a serious question concerning the
jurisdictional scope of the amended section 7.00
According to the Court, the bank merger if viewed purely as an
assets acquisition, could not be within the purview of section 7 since
that section reaches only those acquisitions of corporate assets made
by corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC. 10' Under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 10 2 the FTC does not have jurisdiction over banks. 10 3 In order to bring the merger within the literal
terms of section 7, the United States argued that the proposed action
0 However, determining
should be viewed as a stock acquisition. 1°
that the arrangement actually constituted a consolidation, the Court
concluded that the merger could not technically be viewed as a stock
acquisition. 05 The banks, therefore, argued that section 7 did not
98. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
99. Id. at 330. The banks proposing to merge were the Philadelphia National
Bank and Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank. Id.
100. Id. at 335-55.
101. Id. at 335-36; see note 68 supra.
102. 15 U.S.C. §§41-58 (1976).
103. See 374 U.S. at 336, citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970) (currently codified in 15
U.S.C. §45(a)(2) (1976)). Subsection 5(a)(6) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
provides in pertinent part: "The [Federal Trade] Commission is empowered and
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, . . . from
using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce." 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(6) (1970) (emphasis added) (currently
codified in 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1976)). The quoted portion is identical to that in effect
at the time of the PNB suit. See Act of March 21, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stat.
111.
104. 374 U.S. at 336-37 n.13. Corporations involved in a stock acquisition do not
have to be under the jurisdiction of the FTC to come within the reach of § 7. See note
68 supra.
105. 374 U.S. at 337; see id. at 332 n.7. The Court stated that "itihe proposed
merger . . .is technically a consolidation, since the resulting bank will be a different
entity from either of the constituent banks, whereas if the transaction were a merger,
Girard would disappear into PNB and PNB would survive." Id.
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apply. 10 6 The Court conceded that a bank merger did not fit into
either category neatly, 10 7 but rejected the banks' assertion that
section 7 was not applicable to the instant case.10 8 The Court's
holding was based upon the purposes behind the 1950 Amendments. 0 9 In discussing those purposes, the Court commented:
Congress contemplated that the 1950 Amendment would give § 7
a reach which would bring the entire range of corporate
amalgamations, from pure stock acquisitions to pure assets
acquisitions, within the scope of § 7. Thus, the stock-acquisition
and assets-acquisition provisions, read together, reach mergers,
which fit neither category perfectly but lie somewhere between
the two ends of the spectrum. So construed, the specific
exception for acquiring corporations not subject to the FTC's
jurisdiction excludes from the coverage of § 7 only assets
acquisitions by such corporations when not accomplished by
merger.110
The PNB Court then observed that the law was settled that
"'immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied.'"'""
Furthermore, displaying an attitude reminiscent of the duPont
opinion," 2 the Court refused to be influenced by an administrative
determination that the amended section 7 did not reach bank
3
mergers. 1
Overcoming the jurisdictional obstacle, the PNB Court then
faced the problem of market definition - both product and
geographic." 4 Banks provide a number of services, many of which
are also provided by other financial institutions, such as small loan
companies, savings and loan associations, and mutual savings
banks. The Court, however, had "no difficulty in determining the
'line of commerce' . . . [to be that] 'cluster of products' (various kinds
of credit) and services (such as checking accounts and trust
administration) denoted by the term 'commercial banking.' ,15 The
Court also expressed "no difficulty" in defining the relevant
106. Id. at 337 n.14.
107. Id. at 337.
108. Id. at 341.
109. Id. at 342-43; see notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
110. 374 U.S. at 342-43 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The Court stated
further that "[a]ny other construction would be illogical and disrespectful of the plain
congressional purpose in amending § 7, because it would create a large loophole in a
statute designed to close a loophole." Id.
111. Id. at 348, quoting California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485
(1962).
112. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
7
113. 3 4 U.S. at 348 & n.24.

114. Id. at 355-62.
115. Id. at 356.
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geographic market as the four-county area in which the two banks
maintained offices.' 16 The Court recognized, but considered "of little
significance"' 17 the fact that "bank offices on the perimeter of the
area may be in effective competition with bank offices within."118
However, given the fact that large borrowers and depositors find it
practical to do a major part of their banking business outside their
home community, while small borrowers and depositors are
restricted to bank offices in their immediate neighborhoods, ' 19 the
Court was forced to reach "a workable compromise."' 20 The
"compromise" consisted of
some fair intermediate delineation which avoids the indefensible
extremes of drawing the market either so expansively as to make
the effect of the merger upon competition seem insignificant,
because only the very largest bank customers are taken into
account in defining the market, or so narrowly as to place [the
banks] . . . in different markets, because only the smallest
12
customers are considered. '
Despite the Court's willingness to adopt a "compromise" market, the
opinion reveals an underlying desire to select a relevant market in
which a section 7 violation could be established.
Finally, having determined the relevant market, the PNB Court
reached the ultimate question under section 7 - whether the effect of
the merger "may be substantially to lessen competition" in the
relevant market.' 22 The Court initially stated:
Clearly, this is not the kind of question which is susceptible of a
ready and precise answer in most cases. It requires not merely
an appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger upon
competition, but a prediction of its impact upon competitive
conditions in the future; this is what is meant when it is said
that the amended § 7 was intended to arrest anticompetitive
23
tendencies in their "incipiency."'1

116. Id. at 361.
117. Id. at 360.
118. Id. at 359-60 & n.37. The Court conceded: "To be sure, there is still some
artificiality in deeming the four-county area the relevant 'section of the country' so far
as businessmen located near the perimeter are concerned. But such fuzziness would
seem inherent in any attempt to delineate the relevant geographical market." Id. at
360 n.37.
119. Id. at 360.
120. Id. at 361.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 362.
123. Id., citing Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317, 322 (1962).
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Emphasizing the business community's need to be able to "assess
the legal consequences of a merger with some confidence,"1 24 and the
"danger of subverting congressional intent by permitting a toobroad economic investigation,"1 25 the Court concluded that "in any
case in which it is possible, without doing violence to the
congressional objective embodied in § 7, to simplify the test of
illegality, the courts ought to do so in the interest of sound and
practical judicial administration.'

1

26

As the Court explained, this

simplified test amounted to a rule of presumptive illegality:
We noted in Brown Shoe Co. that "[t]he dominant theme
pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments
[to § 7] was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of
economic concentration in the American economy." This intense
congressional concern with the trend toward concentration
warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of
market structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive
effects. Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a
firm controlling of an undue percentage share of the relevant
market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration
of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantiallythat it must be enjoined in the absence
of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have
1

such anticompetitive effects.

27

Unfortunately, the Court declined to articulate a blanket rule for
determining when a corporation controls an "undue percentage
share" of the market, and merely held that the thirty percent market
share resulting from the PNB merger threatened to create undue
1

concentration.

28

Of course, it should be noted that the thirty percent figure was
reached only with reference to the markets constructed by the
Court.' 29 By narrowly defining the relevant product and geographic

markets, the Court increased the size of the market share involved
and thereby facilitated the establishment of a section 7 violation.
Moreover, little attention was given to the question of what the
thirty percent referred to.130 Nor did the Court consider whether
market shares in "commercial banking" meant the same thing as
124. 374 U.S. at 362.
125. Id.

126. Id. (emphasis added).
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 362-63 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 364.
See notes 114-21 and accompanying text supra.
See 374 U.S. at 331, 364 & n.40.
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they did in manufacturing or selling. Indeed, the Court's failure to
distinguish "commercial banking" from other types of commercial
activity was further emphasized by its statement that "the four
largest banks after the merger will foreclose 78 percent of the
relevant market." 13 1 The Court never explained how a bank can
foreclose a share of the market in light of the consumer's usual
freedom to take his money elsewhere if dissatisfied with the service
he is receiving. In addition, the Court failed to identify what or who
is likely to be foreclosed.
An examination of these questions might have led to a different
result in PNB. Moreover, these questions present the issue of the role
statistics should assume in proving the requisite anticompetitive
effect. Although the Court drew upon other cases to support its
conclusion that the percentages showed that the merger tended to
lessen competition substantially,1 32 the Court's failure to consider
the questions raised seemed to make them irrelevant as a matter of
law.
The PNB Court's approach was clear. In a horizontal merger, a
showing of a percentage market share alone would be sufficient to
establish an anticompetitive effect.' 33 Seven years later, in a
dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan lamented the PNB approach in
United States v. PhillipsburgNational Bank & Trust Co.,134 stating:

"[t]he legality of every merger of two directly competing banks - no
matter how small - is placed in doubt if a court, through what has
become an 'antitrust numerology,' concludes that the merger
'produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the
relevant market.'

"135

E.

The Demise of Columbia Steel

During 1964, the year following the PNB decision, the Court, in
36
United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington,1
expressly indicated its disapproval of the Columbia Steel philosophy
37
by holding that the "case must be confined to its special facts."'
Because of the doubt that had existed prior to the Court's PNB
131. Id. at 366.
132. See id. at 365-66.
133. Id. at 363-67; see text accompanying notes 127-28 supra.
134. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
135. Id. at 374 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted), quoting United States v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665, 673 (1964). Later, under the
Burger Court, the philosophy of reliance upon market shares without any examination of their significance was rejected. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,
415 U.S. 486 (1974). For a discussion of General Dynamics, see notes 262-96 and
accompanying text infra.
136. 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
137. Id. at 672.
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decision concerning the applicability of section 7 to bank mergers,' 38
the Government had been relying upon sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.' 39 Therefore, since Lexington was filed prior to the
PNB decision, the Government charged that the consolidation of
First National Bank and Trust Company of Lexington, Kentucky
(First National), and Security Trust Company of Lexington,
(Security Trust) constituted a combination in restraint of trade in
violation of section 1 and a combination and attempt to monopolize
in violation of section 2.140 In deciding that section 1 was violated,
the Court relied upon the four railroad cases that had been rejected
as authority in Columbia Steel,14 1 stating: "The four railroad cases
at least stand for the proposition that where merging companies are
major competitive factors in a relevant market, the elimination of
significant competition between them, by merger or consolidation,
itself constitutes a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."1'42 The
precedential value of Columbia Steel was thereby laid to rest.
F. Relevant Markets Designed for Illegality
1. Product Markets
In the next few years, the Court proceeded "to simplify the test
of illegality," 14 3 in section 7 cases even further. If, under one view of
the relevant market, the market shares produced by a merger were
too small for a section 7 violation to be proved, the Court simply
discovered a market in which the market shares were sufficiently
large to render the merger unlawful.
For example, in the 1964 case of United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America,144 the Government charged that the acquisition of the
Rome Cable Corporation (Rome) by the Aluminum Company of
America (Alcoa) violated section 7.145 The district court found that

there was no violation and dismissed the complaint. 146 On appeal to
the Supreme Court, a principal question concerned the identification
of the appropriate "line of commerce" or product market. 147 Both
companies produced wire and cable 138.
139.
supra.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
1963).
147.

conductor -

made of

See notes 100-13 and accompanying text supra.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). For the pertinent text of these sections, see note 17
376 U.S. at 666.
See notes 21 & 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
376 U.S. at 669-72 (citations omitted).
See text accompanying note 126 supra.
377 U.S. 271 (1964).
Id. at 272-73.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501, 519 (N.D.N.Y.
377 U.S. at 273.
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aluminum, but only Rome produced copper wire and cable. 145
Aluminum wire and cable consisted of both bare and covered
products. 4 9 The parties agreed that bare aluminum conductor was a
separate line of commerce.' 5° Alcoa possessed a 32.5 percent share of
this product market, and Rome held a .3 percent share. 51 Thus, the
acquisition of Rome would only increase Alcoa's share of the bare
aluminum conductor market by only .3 percent - a de minimis
anticompetitive effect for section 7 purposes. Insulated or covered
aluminum conductor, on the other hand, did not constitute a
separate line of commerce because it was in active competition with
insulated copper conductor. 152 Therefore, the district court refused to
consider all aluminum conductor - both bare and covered -

as a

relevant line of commerce, separate and distinct from its copper
counterpart.'5 3 The Supreme Court explained the district court's
rationale for this refusal: "[A] line of commerce cannot be composed
of two parts, one of which independently qualifies as a line of
54
commerce and one of which does not.'
If all conductors were considered to constitute the relevant
market, as the district court considered appropriate, 5 5 Alcoa's and
Rome's shares were a mere 1.8 percent and 1.4 percent respectively. 56 Only if aluminum conductor were considered to be a
separate line of commerce would substantial market shares appear:
27.8 percent belonging to Alcoa and 1.3 percent to Rome. 157 Defining
the relevant product market as all aluminum conductor would give
Alcoa the greatest market share impact after the acquisition of
Rome. Thus, the Court predictably concluded:
The combination of bare and insulated aluminum conductor
products into one market or line of commerce seems to us proper.
148. Id. at 273-74.
149. Id. at 273.
150. Id. at 274.
151. See id. at 273-74.
152. 214 F. Supp. at 506, 508-09. The district court stated:
While aluminum wire and cable is sold at prices generally distinct from copper

and does not have the same price sensitivity, these factors do not destroy the
conclusion that covered aluminum wire and cable is in actual competition with
its copper counterpart and may not be found as a line of commerce herein.
Id. at 509.
153. Id. at 510. After noting that the broad category of covered and bare copper
and aluminum wire constituted a line of commerce, the district court stated that bare
and covered aluminum wire "are not competitive with copper or interchangeable
therewith.. . . Because a broad line of commerce may be proper does not mean that it
may be broken down into all possible fragments." Id.
154. 377 U.S. at 275.
155. 214 F. Supp. at 510; see note 153 supra.
156. 214 F. Supp. at 514.
157. Id.
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Both types are used for the purpose of conducting electricity and
are sold to the same customers, electrical utilities. While the
copper conductor does compete with aluminum conductor, each
has developed distinctive end uses . ... 15
In a footnote, the Court justified its rejection of the line of commerce
selected by the district court by asserting:
[B]are aluminum conductor and conductor generally (aluminum
and copper, bare and insulated) constitute separate lines of
commerce. Having concluded . . . that insulated aluminum
conductor and insulated copper conductor are separable even
though some interproduct competition exists, the conclusion that
aluminum conductor (bare and insulated) is a line of commerce is a
logical extension of the District Court's findings.5 9
Whether or not the conclusion was logical, it is apparent that the
Court, in its attempt to define a relevant market in which a section 7
violation could be found, was quite willing not only to extend, but
also to overturn, the lower court's findings.
That same year, in United States v. ContinentalCan Co., 1 60 the
Court placed glass containers and metal containers together in the
same line of commerce to form a market of glass and metal
containers,1 6 1 stating: "Where the area of effective competition cuts
across industry lines, so must the relevant line of commerce ... ,"162
In his dissent, Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, criticized
the holding:
The bizarre result of the Court's approach is that market
percentages of a nonexistent market enable the Court- to
dispense with "elaborate proof of market structure, market
behavior and probable anticompetitive effects ..
The Court's spurious market-share analysis should not
obscure the fact that the Court is, in effect, laying down a "per
se" rule that mergers between two large companies in related
industries are presumptively unlawful under § 7....
* *,Hereafter, however slight (or even nonexistent) the
competitive impact of a merger on any actual market, businessmen must rest uneasy lest the Court create some "market" in

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

377 U.S. at 276-77 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 277 n.4 (emphasis added).
378 U.S. 441 (1964).
Id. at 457.
Id.
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which the merger presumptively dampens competition, out of
163
bits and pieces of real ones.
2.

Geographic Markets

Two years after ContinentalCan, in 1966, the Court "simplified"
the issue of geographic market definition. In United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co.,164 the Court noted:
The language of . . . section [7] requires merely that the
Government prove the merger may have a substantial anticompetitive effect somewhere in the United States - "in any
section" of the United States. This phrase does not call for the
delineation of a "section of the country" by metes and bounds as
a surveyor would lay off a plot of ground. The Government may
introduce evidence which shows that as a result of a merger
competition may be substantially lessened throughout the
country, or on the other hand it may prove that competition may
be substantially lessened only in one or more sections of the
165
country. In either event, a violation of § 7 would be proved.
G. Protection of Potential Competition
Rapidly approaching the establishment of a per se rule for
mergers, the Court, in 1964, brought a new category of mergers within the reach of section 7 under a "potential competition" theory. The
first case in which the Court developed this new theory was United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. 16 6 El Paso Natural Gas Company
(El Paso) acquired the Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation
(Pacific Northwest) at a time when El Paso was the sole out-of-state
supplier of natural gas to California.16 7 Prior to the acquisition,
Pacific Northwest had been attempting to enter the rapidly
expanding California market,16 8 but it did not have a pipeline into
California, or regulatory approval to enter the California market. 169
It was, therefore, merely a potential competitor, not an actual one.
163. Id. at 469-70, 476-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoting United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
164. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
165. Id. at 549 (emphasis in original), quoting § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 318
(1976).
166. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
167. Id. at 652 n.2. El Paso supplied more than 50% of the gas consumed in the
state. Id.
168. Id. at 654.
169. Id. at 657-58. The Court recognized that "Pacific Northwest, as an
independent entity, could not have obtained a contract from California distributors,
could not have received the gas supplies or financing for a pipeline project to
California, [and] could not have put together a project acceptable to the regulatory
agencies." Id.
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Nonetheless, on review of the record, the Court considered that
"'Congress used the words [in section 7] "may be substantially to
lessen competition," to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.' "170 In holding that there was a section 7
violation, 171 the Court explained:
Pacific Northwest, though it had no pipeline into California,
is shown by this record to have been a substantial factor in the
California market at the time it was acquired by El Paso ...
. . .We would have to wear blinders not to see that the mere
efforts of Pacific Northwest to get into the California market,
though unsuccessful, had a powerful influence on El Paso's
business attitudes within the state. We repeat that one purpose
of § 7 was "to arrest the trend toward concentration, the
tendency to monopoly, before the consumer's alternatives
disappeared through merger ...."
The effect on competition in a particular market through
acquisition of another company is determined by the nature or
extent of that market and by the nearness of the absorbed
company to it, that company's eagerness to enter that market,
its resourcefulness, and so on. Pacific Northwest's position as a
competitive factor in California was not disproved by the fact
that it had never sold gas there.172
Later in the same year, in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical

Co., 173 the Court elaborated upon the "potential competition" theory.

In that case, Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation (Pennsalt) and Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corporation (Olin) jointly formed the PennOlin Chemical Company (Penn-Olin) in order to produce and sell
sodium chlorate in the southeastern United States.1 74 Prior to this
time, Olin never had produced sodium chlorate. 175 Although
Pennsalt had produced the chemical and had sold it in the
southeastern United States, it maintained no processing plants in
that area. 1 76 One issue before the Court, therefore, was whether the
joint agreement 177 to build a plant in the relevant geographic area of
170. Id. at 658 (emphasis in original), quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
171. 376 U.S. at 662.
172. Id. at 658-60 (emphasis in original), quoting United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 (1963).

173. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
174. Id. at 160.
175. Id. at 166.
176. Id. at 162. Pennsalt's sodium chlorate production plant was located in
Portland, Oregon. Id.
177. The defendants argued that § 7 applied only to those situations where the
acquired company was "engaged" in commerce, and not to a newly formed corpora-
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the southeastern United States would tend substantially to lessen
competition within the meaning of section 7.178 The district court
found that "Pennsalt and Olin each possessed the resources and
general capability needed to build its own plant in the southeast and
to compete .. .in that market. Each could have done so if it had

wished." 179 The district court also determined that "the forecasts of
each company indicated that a plant could be operated with
profit."1S However, the district court held that these considerations
were not of controlling significance, except "as a factor in
determining whether, as a matter of probability, both companies
would have entered the market as individual competitors if
Penn-Olin had not been formed. Only in this event would potential
competition between the two companies have been foreclosed by the
joint venture."1
The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the district court's
conclusion was erroneous."l 2 Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the Court,
commented:
Certainly the sole test would not be the probability that both
companies would have entered the market. Nor would the
consideration be limited to the probability that one entered
alone. There still remained for consideration the fact that
Penn-Olin eliminated the potential competition of the corporation that might have remained at the edge of the market,
continually threatening to enter. Just as a merger eliminates
actual competition, this joint venture may well foreclose any
prospect of competition between Olin and Pennsalt in the
relevant sodium chlorate market.18 3
In the Court's view, potential competition was important to preserve
because it could serve as a valuable substitute for actual competition
and even compensate to some extent for the shortcomings of actual
competition.18 4 Thus, the Supreme Court remanded Penn-Olin to the
tion. Id. at 167. The Court held, however, that § 7 applied to joint ventures such as the
one before it, stating: "The test of the section is the effect of the acquisition. Certainly
the formation of a joint venture and purchase by the organizers of its stock would
substantially lessen competition - and indeed foreclose it - as between them, both
being engaged in commerce." Id. at 168.

178. Id. at 168-69.
179. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 129 (D. Del. 1963).

180. Id.
181. Id. at 130 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
182. 378 U.S. at 173.
183. Id. (emphasis in original).
184. Id. at 174. The Court explained its view: "The existence of an aggressive, well
equipped and well financed corporation engaged in the same or related lines of
commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a substantial
incentive to competition which cannot be underestimated." Id. (emphasis added).
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district court to determine whether, absent the joint venture, there
was a reasonable probability that one of the corporations would
have built a plant in the southeast market while the other would
185
have remained a significant potential competitor.
In FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,' 8 6 the potential competition
theory was asserted as a reason to void a merger which eliminated
the acquiring firm as a prospective market entrant. The FTC there
charged that Proctor & Gamble (P & G) had violated section 7 by
acquiring the assets of the Clorox Chemical Company.18 7 Prior to the
merger, Clorox was the leading manufacturer of household liquid
bleach, while P & G produced none. 8 8 P & G had determined,
however, that it was advisable for it to enter the liquid bleach
industry.8 9 Moreover, the FTC found, and the Court agreed, 19° that
"Proctor was the most likely prospective entrant, and absent the
merger would have remained on the periphery, restraining Clorox
from exercising its market power. If Proctor had actually entered,
Clorox's dominant position would have been eroded and the
concentration of the industry reduced."' 19 Therefore, in spite of the
refusal of the Sixth Circuit to enforce the FTC's divestiture order on
the ground that the finding of illegality had been based on "mere
conjecture," possibility, and suspicion, 192 the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case with instructions to enforce the
order. ' 9'1
H. Narrowing the "FailingCompany" Defense
One of the last antitrust cases decided by the Warren Court was
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States,19 which grew out of a joint
operating agreement between the only two daily newspapers of
95
general circulation in Tucson, Arizona - the Star and the Citizen.1
185. Id. at 175-76.
186. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
187. Id. at 569.
188. Id. at 570, 574.
189. Id. at 574. In discussing P & G's decision to enter the liquid bleach market, the
Court noted:
Prior to the acquisition, [P & G] . . . was in the course of diversifying into
product lines related to its basic detergent-soap-cleanser business. Liquid bleach
was a distinct possibility since packaged detergents - [P & G's] . . . primary
product line - and liquid bleach are used complementarily in washing clothes
and fabrics, and in general household cleaning.
Id. at 573.
190. Id. at 581.
191. Id.at 575.
192. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 358 F.2d 74, 83 (6th Cir. 1966).
193. 386 U.S. at 581.
194. 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
195. Id. at 133-34. The agreement provided for the elimination of competition
between the two newspapers by the formation of a corporation owned in equal shares
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Prior to 1940, the Star had operated at a profit, but the Citizen had
sustained losses. 196 In 1940, the owner of the two newspapers

negotiated a joint operating agreement that was to run for 25
years. 19 7 Pursuant to an option in the agreement, the shareholders of
the Citizen acquired the Star's stock.19 8 The Government argued that
this acquisition was illegal under section 7, and also charged that
the joint operating agreement violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. 19 9 Concluding that certain provisions of the joint
operating agreement were per se unlawful, the district court granted
the Government's motion for summary judgment on the allegation
under section 1.2 0 0 At the end of the trial on the section 2 Sherman

Act and section 7 Clayton Act charges, the district court found
20 2
violations of both sections, 2°1 and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The only real defense offered by the two newspapers was the
judicially created "failing company" doctrine2 3 This doctrine arose
out of International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.24 The
acquired company in InternationalShoe "faced the grave probability of a business failure" 20 5 because its resources were depleted and
the prospect of rehabilitation was remote. 20 6 Under these circumstances, the Court held that the acquisition of such a company, when
"not done with a purpose to lessen competition, '

20

7

does not

substantially lessen competition within the meaning of the Clayton
Act. 2°8 Seizing upon a parenthetical note in International Shoe
by the Star and the Citizen. Id. The corporation was to manage the newspapers. Id. at
133. Competition between the papers was to be eliminated by the corporation's
imposition of price fixing, profit pooling, and market control. Id. at 134.
196. Id. at 133.
197. Id. In 1953 the term of the agreement was extended until 1990. Id.
198. Id. at 134-35.
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). For the pertinent text of these sections, see note 17
supra. See also 394 U.S. at 134. The government alleged that the agreement
constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade under § 1 and a monopoly under § 2. Id.
200. United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 993-94 (D. Ariz.
1968).
201. Id. at 994.
202. 394 U.S. at 140.
203. Id. at 136. See Blum, The Failing Company Doctrine, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM.

L. REV. 75, 75-106 (1974); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 339 (1960); Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act: The "Failing Company" Myth, 49 GEO. L.J. 84, 96 (1960); Comment, All the
King's Horses and All the King's Men: The Failing Company Doctrine as a
Conditional Defense to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 643 (1976).
The district court in Citizen Publishing excluded facts tendered to prove the
failing company defense as to the § 1 claim, but admitted them as to the §§ 2 and 7
charges. See 394 U.S. at 136.
204. 280 U.S. 291-(1930).
205. Id. at 302.
206. Id. at 301-02.
207. Id. at 302.
208. Id. at 302-03.
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indicating that there was "no other prospective purchaser," 2 9 the
Citizen Publishing Court limited the "failing company" doctrine to

cases in which "it is established that the company that acquires the
failing company or brings it under dominion is the only available

purchaser,

'210

and placed the "burden of proving that the conditions

of the failing company doctrine have been satisfied .. .on those

who seek refuge under

it.

''

211

Once again, the Court's holding seemed

to be deliberately designed to make it as difficult as possible for
merging companies to satisfy their burden of proof.
I.

On the Brink of a Per Se Rule for Mergers

From an examination of the cases decided by the Warren Court
since Columbia Steel,212 it becomes apparent that the Court was
using section 7 in an effort to create an effective obstacle to the
increasing concentration of American commerce and industry. In
the twelve years that elapsed between duPont21 3 and Citizen
Publishing,214 the Court made its views clear.
By repeatedly expanding the reach of section 7,215 relaxing the
standards for proof of illegality, 216 and toughening the requirements
of a successful defense, 217 the Court clearly was exhibiting a
pro-antitrust attitude or bias. However, the opinions did not always
explain, with the fullness expected of the final arbiter of the law, the
rationales behind some of their conclusions. The absence of
explanation may have made it easier for the subsequent Burger
Court to erode the law of mergers that had developed under the
Warren Court.
209. Id. at 302; see 394 U.S. at 137.
210. 394 U.S. at 138. The Court explained its rationale for imposing this limitation
on the failing company defense: "[I]f another person or group could be interested, a
unit in the competitive system would be preserved and not lost to monopoly power."
Id.
211. Id. at 138-39 (footnote omitted). Noting the existence of numerous companies
that had reorganized through bankruptcy and emerged as strong competitive
companies, the Court stated that "[t]he prospects of reorganization of the Citizen in
1940 would have to be dim or nonexistent to make the failing company doctrine
applicable to this case." Id. at 138.
212, For a discussion of Columbia Steel, see notes 16-35 and accompanying text
supra.
213. See notes 39-65 and accompanying text supra.
214. See notes 194-211 and accompanying text supra.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United
States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United States
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962);
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957):
216. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
217. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
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Nevertheless, as a practical matter, Justice Stewart's statement
in 1966 that "the Government always wins" 2 18 was largely correct.
By the latter part of the Warren era, it appeared that mergers and
acquisitions were presumptively, if not per se, unlawful.
III.

THE TRANSITION PERIOD

In 1968, Richard M. Nixon was elected President of the United
States. His first appointee to the Supreme Court was Warren E.
Burger, to replace Chief Justice Earl Warren. Chief Justice Burger
was sworn in on June 23, 1969, approximately three months after the
Citizen Publishing21 9 decision was announced. With the appointment of a new Chief Justice, a period of transition began.
In the brief period of transition, the composition of the Court
changed considerably. In addition to the new Chief Justice,
President Nixon appointed Justice Blackmun to replace Justice
Fortas, Justice Powell to replace Justice Black, and Justice
Rehnquist to replace Justice Harlan. As the new members began to
take their seats on the Court and to participate in decisions, one
could see the pendulum begin to swing in a different direction. The
220
Court began a retreat from the earlier "simplified test of illegality"
and the almost per se approach toward mergers under section 7. In
the course of the transition, as the new majority was forming, the
Government gradually stopped winning.
Two section 7 cases decided during this period appropriately
221
demonstrate the first stage of the change in the Court's attitude.
One of these cases was United States v. PhillipsburgNationalBank
& Trust Co.,222 which involved the proposed merger between the
Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Company (PNBT) and the
Second National Bank of Phillipsburg (SNB). 223 The banks were
relatively small, but they were direct competitors, predominantly
serving the residents of Phillipsburg, New Jersey. 224 The Court ruled
that the merger had to be judged by the antitrust standards
announced in PNB225 despite the small size of the Phillipsburg
22 6
banks in comparison with the towering size of those in PNB.
218. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
219. For a discussion of this case, see notes 194-211 and accompanying text supra.
220. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.

221. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); United States v.
Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970). See also Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).

222. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
223. Id. at 352, 354.
224. Id. at 354.
225. For a discussion of PNB, see notes 98-135 and accompanying text supra.
226. 399 U.S. at 357-58. Indeed, the Phillipsburg Court went so far as to state:
[C]ompetitive [small] commercial banks, with their cluster of products and
services, play a particularly significant role in a small community unable to
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In discussing the relevant markets for the case before it, the
Court firmly stated that the appropriate product market was
"commercial banking" 227 and that the district court erred in
emphasizing the competition between the two Phillipsburg banks
and

other types

of financial

institutions. 22 8

The

Court next

determined that the appropriate geographic market was the local
area where "the proposed merger's effect would be 'direct and
immediate.' "229 Then, applying the "simplified test of illegality" of
PNB, 230 the Court concluded that the proposed merger was
' 23
"inherently likely to lessen competition substantially. 1
Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Harlan in a partially
dissenting opinion which focused in part upon the significance of
regulatory barriers to entry into banking.2 3 2 This aspect of the
dissenting opinion reflected a leniency toward mergers that would
soon become the prevailing attitude of the new Supreme Court
majority. The dissent also questioned whether the presumption of
illegality raised by percentage figures could be rebutted.2 33 Despite
the magnitude of those percentage figures, Justice Harlan suggested
that the anticompetitive effects of the merger might not be
significant. 234 Therefore, he felt that the case should be remanded to
support a large variety of alternative financial institutions. Thus, if anything, it
is even more true in the small towns than in the large city that "if the
businessman is denied credit because his banking alternatives have been
eliminated by mergers, the whole edifice of an entrepreneurial system is
threatened; if the costs of banking services and credit are allowed to become
excessive by the absence of competitive pressures, virtually all costs, in our credit
economy, will be affected ...."
Id. at 358, quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963).
227. 399 U.S. at 360-61. It should be noted that commercial banking was also the
relevant product market in PNB. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
228. 399 U.S. at 359-60. The other types of institutions examined by the district
court included savings and loan associations, pension funds, mutual funds, insurance,
and finance companies. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 306 F.
Supp. 645, 646-51 (D.N.J. 1969).
229. 399 U.S. at 362, quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 357 (1963). The actual geographic market selected by the Court was the
Phillipsburg-Easton area. 399 U.S. at 365. The district court had used an area that
was approximately four times as large as Phillipsburg-Easton. See id. at 362, citing
United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645, 652-53,
656-58 (D.N.J. 1969).
230. See text accompanying notes 126 & 27 supra.
231. 399 U.S. at 367. Justice Stewart took no part in the Phillipsburgdecision, and
Justice Blackmun, who had joined the Court less than three weeks earlier, did not
participate in the consideration or decision of the cases.
232. Id. at 377-79 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-19(B)(3)
(West Supp. 1970).
233. 399 U.S. at 377-78 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Court's
reliance upon percentages to find a § 7 violation, see text accompanying note 127
supra.
234. 399 U.S. at 377-78 (Harlan, J., dissenting). After noting a recent change in the
New Jersey statutory scheme that substantially increased the possibility of new
banking entry into Phillipsburg, Justice Harlan stated:
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afford the banks an opportunity to rebut the presumption

illegality.

235

of

With the majority's decision in United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp.,23 6 it can firmly be stated that the pendulum was
swinging in a different direction than it had under the

Warren Court. A new majority was forming which began the retreat
from the "simplified test of illegality 237 and the previous per se
approach to mergers under section 7. The government was not yet
losing, but neither was it winning. Falstaff represents the turning
point.
The case involved the 1965 acquisition of Narragansett Brewing
Company, the largest seller of beer in New England, by Falstaff

Brewing Corporation, the nation's fourth largest producer of beer. 238
Although Falstaff did not sell beer in New England prior to the
acquisition, it desired to enter the New England market in order to
achieve a national distribution. 239 To accomplish this goal, Falstaff
made several efforts during the early 1960's to enter the market by
acquisition. 240 When Falstaff agreed to acquire Narragansett in
1965,241 the Government attacked the acquisition on the grounds

If one assumes the regulatory barriers to entry have been permanently
lowered, it would seem that the competitive significance of this merger may well
be considerably overstated by the percentage figures alone. . . . In a market
dominated by banks of enormous absolute size, with assets of hundreds of
millions and even billions of dollars, it is of course unlikely that a new entrant
will quickly become a substantial competitive force. The same is not true,
however, of a market in which the largest competitor is, in absolute terms, rather
small.
* . [TIThe significance of the percentage figures recited in the Court's opinion
can only be fully evaluated after consideration of the present entry conditions in
the Phillipsburg-Easton area.
Id. at 378-79 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For the Court's subsequent treatment of
regulatory barriers to entry, see notes 347-49 and accompanying text infra.
235. 399 U.S. at 382 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
236. 410 U.S. 526 (1973). See Comment, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.:
An Examination of Potential Competition, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545 (1973).
237. See text accompanying notes 126 & 27 supra. By the time of the Court's 1972
decision in Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972), Justices Powell and
Rehnquist had joined the bench. The separate opinions of Justices Stewart and
Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger lend further credence to the author's opinion that
this period constituted a distinct transition from the Court's previously liberal
attitudes concerning the Government's attempts to prohibit corporate amalgamations. See id. at 579-82 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 582-95 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 595 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
238. 410 U.S. at 528.
239. Id. at 529. According to the Court, Falstaff desired to convert to national
status because "[n]ational brewers possess competitive advantage since they are able
to advertise on a nationwide basis, their beers have greater prestige than regional or
local beers, and they are less affected by the weather or labor problems in a particular
region." Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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that it precluded the competition of Falstaff, a potential entrant. 242
The Government further argued that the acquisition eliminated the
competition that would have existed if Falstaff had entered the
market de novo, or by a so-called "toe-hold" acquisition - an
acquisition of a small firm in the market. 243 However, the district
court held that the Government had failed to establish that the
acquisition would result in a substantial lessening of competition
244
and dismissed the complaint.

The Supreme Court reversed, 245 holding that the district court
erred in concluding that Falstaff "had no intent to enter the New
England market except through acquisition and that it therefore
'246
could not be considered a potential competitor in that market.
According to the Court, it was a mistake of law for the district court
to assume that Falstaff could not be considered as a potential
competitor simply because it would never have entered the market de
novo. 247 The Court also held that the district court "failed to give
separate consideration to whether Falstaff was a potential competitor in the sense that it was so positioned on the edge of the market
that it exerted a beneficial influence on competitive conditions in
24
that market." 8
Since it was remanding the case to the district court for an
assessment of Falstaff as a potential competitor, 249 the Court felt
that it was unnecessary to consider the Government's second
argument - that section 7 bars a merger that leaves "competition in
the marketplace exactly as it was, neither hurt nor helped, ' 250 but
results in less competition than would have existed had the company
25 1
entered the market either de novo or by a "toe-hold" acquisition.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 530. A "toe-hold" acquisition has been described as "the case of one
company acquiring a very small company in another industry, presumably with the
thought of expanding that small company into a more substantial force." E. W.
KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS 260 (1973).
244. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 332 F. Supp. 970, 972-73 (D.R.I.
1971).
245. 410 U.S. at 538.
246. Id. at 532.
247. Id.; see 332 F. Supp. at 972. The district court found as a matter of fact that
"the executive management of Falstaff had consistently decided not to attempt to
enter said market unless it could acquire a brewery with a strong and viable
distribution system such as that possessed by Narragansett." Id.
248. 410 U.S. at 532-33.
249. Id. at 537.
250. Id.
251. Id. Recognizing that there had been "traces of this view" in previous cases,
the Court pointed out that it had not, in any of those opinions, "squarely faced the
question, if for no other reason than because there has been no necessity to consider
it." Id. at 537-38 (footnote omitted), citing Ford Motor Co. v. United StateO, 405 U.S.
562, 567 (1972), FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 586 (1967), and United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173 (1964).
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Falstaff represents a turning point, not because the Court
refused to consider the Government's second argument, but because
it remanded the case "for proper assessment of Falstaff as an
on-the-fringe potential competitor.

' 25 2

Earlier in PNB,2 5 3 the Court

had dispensed with the requirement of concrete proof of an
anticompetitive effect, 254 and the cases appear to be inconsistent in
this respect. As had been observed in PNB, the type of evaluation
ordered on the Falstaff remand necessarily required a broad
economic investigation and "elaborate proof of market structure,
market behavior, [and] probable anti-competitive effects.

' 255

There-

fore, the Court's order on remand placed a heavy burden on the
Government's shoulders.
Furthermore, as Justices Douglas and Marshall stated in their
separate concurring opinions, the majority apparently was requiring
an appraisal of the present anticompetitive effect of the acquisition,
which was not only difficult of proof, but also very likely
nonexistent. 256 Justice Marshall explained:
Since the effect of a perceived potential entrant depends upon
the perception of those already in the market, it may in some
cases be difficult to prove. Moreover, in a market which is
already competitive, the existence of a perceived potential
entrant will have no present effect at all. The entry by
acquisition of such a firm may nonetheless have an anticompetitive effect by eliminating an actual potential competitor ...
[E]ven if a firm at the fringe of the market exerts no present
procompetitive effect, its entry by acquisition may end for all
time the promise of more effective competition at such future
date.
• . . [W]here a powerful firm is engaging in a related line of
commerce at the fringe of the relevant market, where it has a
strong incentive to enter the market de novo, and where it has
the financial capabilities to do so, we have not hesitated to
ascribe to it the role of an actual potential entrant. In such cases,
we have held that § 7 prohibits an entry by acquisition since
such an entry eliminates the possibility of future actual
25
competition which would occur if there were an entry de novo.

7

252. 410 U.S. at 537.
253. See notes 98-135 and accompanying text supra.
254. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
255. See id.
256. 410 U.S. at 538-39 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 560-61 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
257. Id. at 560-61 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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From an analysis of Justice Marshall's observations, it appears
that the majority was retreating to some extent from its previous
efforts to "simplify the test of illegality. ' 258 Whatever may be
thought of the Warren Court's efforts to liberalize the burden of proof
under section 7, it must be conceded that the movement toward a per
se rule for mergers enabled "businessmen [to] assess the legal
consequences of a merger with some confidence [and engage in]
sound business planning. '259 A per se rule had the advantage of
shifting the judicial focus from effect to conduct. 260 Nevertheless,
with the passing of judicial control, the tendency toward a liberal
standard of proof diminished to the point of virtual extinction, and
the burden upon the Government increased correspondingly.
IV.

THE BURGER COURT ERA:

A

RETURN TO

THE "RULE OF REASON"

A.

The First Retreat: General Dynamics

The new Court wasted little time in turning things around. 2 1 In
26 2
its first merger case, United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,
Justice Stewart's majority opinion 263 made it clear that the
'264
Government would no longer "always win.
In this case, Material Service Corporation and its subsequent
parent, General Dynamics Corporation, acquired the stock of United
Electric Coal Companies. 265 Material Service was a large midwest
producer of coal from deep shaft mines, and at the time of the
258. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
259. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
260. The Court in PNB explained the difficulties of evaluating the effect of section
7 activities:
[W]hether the effect of the merger "may be substantially to lessen competition"
in the relevant market . . .is not the kind of question which is susceptible of a
ready and precise answer in most cases. It requires not merely an appraisal of
the immediate impact of the merger upon competition, but a prediction of its
impact upon competitive conditions in the future ....
Id.
261. In March of 1974 the new majority consisted of Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun, Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist. Justices Douglas, Brennan,
White, and Marshall became the new minority.
262. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
263. Justice Stewart dissented in several of the earlier merger cases. See United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 572 (1973); Citizen Publishing Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131, 143 (1969); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441, 467 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 281 (1964);
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665, 673 (1964);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 373 (1963).
264. See text accompanying note 2 supra. For a general discussion of the new
majority and mergers, see Shenefield, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments Class Actions, Mergers and Market Definition: A New Trend Toward Neutrality, 32
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 299, 321-45 (1975).
265. 415 U.S. at 488.
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acquisition, owned all of the capital stock of the Freeman Coal
Mining Corporation. 26 6 United Electric, in contrast, was a coal
producer operating only in strip or open pit mines.2 67 In 1954,
Material Service began acquiring the stock of United Electric. 268 By
1959, Material Service had accumulated a thirty-four percent stock
interest in United Electric, thereby enabling it to place Freeman's
president on the Executive Committee of United Electric. 26 9 Shortly
thereafter, Material Service was acquired by General Dynamics,
which continued to accumulate United Electric stock. 270 Ultimately,
United Electric became a wholly owned subsidiary of General
Dynamics. 271 Although the Government contended that the acquisition of United Electric substantially lessened competition between

272
Freeman and United Electric in the production and sale of coal,

the district court dismissed the complaint.273
The primary issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned the
validity of the district court's finding that the evidence did not show
that the acquisition substantially lessened competition between
Freeman and United Electric in any product or geographic
market. 274 The Government had sought to establish a section 7

violation through the use of statistics which showed that the coal
industry was concentrated among a small number of large
producers, that the concentration was increasing, and that the
acquisition in question would contribute to the trend toward
concentration. 275 In a remarkable example of judicial candor, Justice
Stewart conceded:
In prior decisions involving horizontal mergers between
competitors, this Court has found prima facie violations of § 7 of
the Clayton Act from aggregate statistics of the sort relied on by
the United States in this case.
266. Id.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 489.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490.
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534, 555-58 (N.D. Ill.

1972).

273. Id. at 560. The district court rejected the Government's use of "coal" as the
relevant product market, id. at 556, the Government's proposed geographic markets of
Illinois and the Eastern Interior Coal Province, id. at 556-57, and the Government's
findings that United Electric and Freeman were competitors, id. at 558-59. The
appropriate product market was considered by that court to be "the energy market."
Id. at 555. The relevant geographic markets accepted by the district court were those
proposed by the defendants. Id. at 557. See Griffin & Kushner, Geographic
Submarkets in Bituminous Coal: Defining a Southeastern Submarket, 21 ANTITRUST
Bull. 67 (1976).
274. 415 U.S. at 492, citing United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp.
534, 558-59 (N.D. Ill. 1972).

275. 415 U.S. at 494.
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The effect of adopting this approach to a determination of a
"substantial" lessening of competition is to allow the government to rest its case on a showing of even small increases of
market share or market concentration in those industries or
markets where concentration is already great or has been
recently increasing, since "if concentration is already great, the
importance of preventing even slight increases in concentration
and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is
'27 6
correspondingly great.
Nevertheless, despite the Government's statistics, the Court was
satisfied that the district court did not err when it found that there
was no substantial lessening of competition. 277 The Court, relying on
Brown Shoe,278 emphasized that, while statistics were significant,
they "were not conclusive indicators of anticompetitive effects. '279
Therefore, the Court agreed with the district court that other factors,
such as the decrease in coal consumption in recent years, 28 0 the
increase in coal use by the electric utility industry, 28 1 and the
increase in the number of long term requirements contracts, 2 2 were
28 3
to be given great weight.
The Court proceeded to discuss another significant aspect of the
coal industry:
A . ..significant indicator of a company's power effectively to

compete with other companies lies in the state of a company's
uncommitted reserves of recoverable coal..

.

. In a market where

the availability and price for coal are set by long-term contracts
rather than immediate or short-term purchases and sales,
reserves rather than past production are the best measure of a
company's ability to compete.28 4
In light of the district court's findings that United Electric's coal
reserve prospects were "unpromising, ' 28 5 and that United Electric

276. Id. at 496-97, quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S.
271, 279 (1964).
277. 415 U.S. at 498.
278. For a discussion of Brown Shoe, see notes 70-97 and accompanying text
supra.
279. 415 U.S. at 498; see text accompanying notes 91-97 supra.
280. 415 U.S. at 499.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 499-500.
283. Id. at 498.
284. Id. at 502 (emphasis added). See 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 281 (1974); 24 DRAKE L.
REV. 223 (1974).
285. 341 F. Supp. at 559.
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was unable to acquire additional reserves, 286 the Court concluded
2 7
that the district court's dismissal was proper. 1
The abrupt shift in the attitude of the Court is best illustrated by
the pointed comment of Justice Douglas in his dissent. 28 8 He stated

that "the judgment may not be affirmed except on a deep-seated
289
judicial bias against § 7 of the Clayton Act."
Since United Electric's reserve position had been evaluated as of
the time of trial rather than the time of acquisition, the dissent
criticized the majority's rejection of the past and present production
statistics offered by the Government. 290 Justice Douglas commented:
"Many of the commitments here which reduced United's available
reserves occurred after the acquisition

.... "291

Indeed, it was

observed that "all the district court's findings were made as of the
time of the trial. ' 292 Thus, the dissent apparently endorsed the
Government's argument that the district court erred in giving undue
293
weight to post-acquisition evidence.

In justifying its treatment of the post-acquisition evidence of
United Electric's coal reserves, the majority observed:
This Court indicated in United States v. E. I. duPont de
Nemours & Co. that a merger may be attacked ab initio long
after its culmination if effect on competition not apparent
immediately after the merger subsequently appears, since § 7
was designed to arrest the creation of monopolies "'in their
incipiency'

and "'incipience"'

. . . denotes not the time the

286. Id. at 560. The government urged on appeal that a defense based upon
depleted resources was essentially a "failing company" defense, which required a
demonstration that there was no alternative method of prolonging the company's life.
Id. at 506-07; see notes 203-11 and accompanying text supra. See also Comment,
Horizontal Mergers and the Resource Depletion Defense - United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 759, 768-71 (1975); Comment, supra
note 203, at 665-71, 676-84; 24 DRAKE L. REV. 223, 232-33 (1974).
287. 415 U.S. at 503-04.
288. Id. at 511-27 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall
joined in this dissent.
289. Id. at 527 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Contra,Knapp, General Dynamics, Mirage
or Oasis?, 26 MERCER L. REV. 557 (1975). This commentator does not view General
Dynamics as a turning point in the line of Government successes in antitrust cases,
concluding:
Because General Dynamics is a 5-4 affirmance of a decision dismissing a
section 7 Clayton Act complaint, it cannot be regarded, as a reversal of
divestiture might be, as an indication of the degree to which the Supreme Court
may go in its application of section 7.. . . General Dynamics does not lead to the
conclusion that the present Court would reach a different result if Brown Shoe
and its successors of the 60's were to come before the Court on the same records.
Id. at 589.
290. 415 U.S. at 523-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 524 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
292. Id. (emphasis in original).
293. Id. at 504. For a discussion of the role of post-acquisition evidence in General
Dynamics, see 53 N.C.L. REV. 535 (1975).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

35

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23: p. 213

stock was acquired but any time when the acquisition threatens
to ripen into a prohibited effect. .

.

. In the context of the present

case, the "time of suit" rule coupled with the limited weight
given to post-merger evidence of no anticompetitive impact tends
to give the Government a "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" advantage over a § 7 defendant: post-merger evidence showing a
lessening of competition may constitute an "incipiency" on
which to base a divestiture suit, but evidence showing that such
lessening has not, in fact, occurred, cannot be accorded "too
much weight.

' 2' 9 4

Apparently, the majority viewed the determination of the weight to
be given post-acquisition evidence solely as a question of fair play.
It is interesting to observe the use of Warren Court cases in
GeneralDynamics to substantiate the Court's new direction. Just as
it had relied upon Brown Shoe to reject the Government's statistics, 2 95 the Court used duPont to justify the use of post-acquisition

evidence. That both of these cases reached a result entirely contrary
to that of General Dynamics appeared irrelevant. Moreover, the
General Dynamics Court overlooked the fact that much of the Brown
Shoe and duPont opinions were devoted to the objective of section 7
- "to arrest apprehended consequences of intercorporate relationships before those relationships could work their evil.

'296

B. A Restrictive View of Geographic Markets and Its Effect
on the "Potential Competition" Doctrine
Two cases decided on the same day at the end of the Burger
Court's 1973 term provide clear examples of that Court's attitudes
toward mergers. As Justice White stated in his dissenting opinion to
one of those cases, 297 these decisions of "the Court's new antitrust
majority [have] chipped away at the policies of § 7 of the Clayton
Act.,

298

United States v. Marine Bancorporation,299 involved a challenge
to the proposed merger between the National Bank of Commerce of
Seattle (NBC) and the Washington Trust Bank of Spokane (WTB). 300
294. 415 U.S. at 505 n.13, quoting FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592,
598 (1965) (citations omitted). For a discussion of the duPont decision, see notes 39-65
and accompanying text supra.
295. See text accompanying notes 278 & 79 supra.
296. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597-98 (1957);
see text accompanying notes 57 & 91-97 supra.
297. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 642-55 (1974) (White,
J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 642 (White, J., dissenting).
299. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
300. Id. at 605.
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The home cities of the two banks were almost 300 miles apart, at
opposite ends of the state.30 1 The banks were not in direct
competition to any significant degree in Spokane, nor in any other
part of the State of Washington.302 The Government argued that "the
acquisition may substantially lessen competition in the Spokane
30 3
market, in Eastern Washington, and in the State as a whole."
Relying exclusively upon the "potential competition" theory,30 4 the
Government contended that the acquisition of WTB eliminated NBC
both as an actual competitor and as a perceived potential entrant
into the Spokane banking market. 3 5 The district court held against
the Government on all aspects of the case, 30 6 and the Supreme Court
affirmed.

3 7
0

One of the issues before the Supreme Court involved the
determination of the relevant geographic market.308 Although the
Government had stipulated prior to trial that the Spokane area was
one relevant market, 309 it also contended that the entire state was an
appropriate "section of the country. '3 10 The Government was
arguing that, even though an acquisition may have no effect in the
301. Id.
302. Id. The Court noted that neither bank maintained banking offices in the home
city of the other bank. Id
303. Brief for the United States at 54, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418
U.S. 602 (1974).
304. 418 U.S. at 605, 623-40; see notes 166-93 & 245-48 and accompanying text
supra.
305. 418 U.S. at 626; see notes 329 & 330 and accompanying text infra. The Court
described the Government's five-step argument:
First, it argues that the potential-competition doctrine applies with full force to
commercial banks. Second, it submits that the Spokane commercial banking
market is sufficiently concentrated to invoke that doctrine. Third, it urges us to
resolve in its favor the issue left open in Falstaff [whether the potential
competition doctrine proscribes a merger solely because it eliminates the prospect
for increased competition that might result if the acquiring firm were forced to
enter the market de novo or through a toe-hold acquisition]. Fourth, it contends
that without regard to the possibility of future deconcentration of the Spokane
market, that challenged merger is illegal, under established doctrine because it
eliminates NBC as a perceived potential entrant. Finally, it asserts that the
merger will eliminate WTB's potential for growth outside Spokane.
418 U.S. at 626.
306. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,496
(W.D. Wash. 1973).
307. 418 U.S. at 605-06.
308. Id. at 619-23. The district court defined the relevant product market as
"commercial banking," and none of the parties disputed this finding. See id. at
618-19, citing United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 1973-1 Trade Cas.(CCH)
74,496 at 94,243 (W.D. Wash. 1973).
309. 418 U.S. at 619. The district court determined that the Spokane metropolitan
area was the appropriate geographic market. 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,496 at
94,244.
310. 418 U.S. at 620. In describing the Government's rationale, the Court explained:
"[T]he Government asserts that the State is an economically differentiated region,
because its boundaries delineate an area within which Washington banks are
insulated from most forms of competition by out-of-state banking organizations." Id.
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market served by the acquired company, it does not follow that the
acquisition will have no impact in the market served by the
acquiring company or even in an area served by neither. The
acquisition may make the acquiring company bigger, stronger, and
more able to compete or dominate its market. In effect, the
Government was contending that an acquisition in one geographic
311
area may have an anticompetitive effect in another area.
The Burger Court, however, rejected the Government's argument
as contrary to precedent, 12 once again bringing previous Warren
Court decisions back to haunt the Government. The Marine
Bancorporation Court relied upon the former majority's narrow
restrictions on the scope of geographic markets in PNB31 3 and
Phillipsburg,3 14 to conclude:
Without exception the Court has treated "section of the country"
and "relevant geographic market" as identical, and it has
defined the latter concept as the area in which the goods or
services at issue are marketed to a significant degree by the
acquired firm. In cases in which the acquired firm markets its
products or services on a local, regional, and national basis, the
Court has acknowledged the existence of more than one relevant
geographic market. But in no previous § 7 case has the Court
determined the legality of a merger by measuring its effects on
areas where the acquired firm is not a direct competitor. .

.

. We

hold that in a potential-competition case like this one, the
relevant geographic market or appropriatesection of the country
is the area in which the acquired firm is an actual, direct
315
competitor.
This ruling is significant because it constitutes a departure from
the precedent of the Warren Court. In order to identify an area
within which an anticompetitive effect could be established, the
Warren Court displayed a willingness to expand or contract the
geographic market as necessary. 31 6 The Burger Court, on the other
311. See id. at 621-23.
312. Id.at 620-23.
313. See notes 116-21 and accompanying text supra.
314. See note 229 and accompanying text supra.
315. 418 U.S. at 620-22 (footnotes and citation omitted) (emphasis added). This
holding appears to be at odds with the 1964 decision in United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); see notes 166-72 and accompanying text supra.
Nevertheless, the Marine Bancorporation Court dismissed this inconsistency by
stating that "El Paso was in reality ... an actual-competition rather than a
potential-competition case." 418 U.S. at 623.
316. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966). In Pabst,
the Warren Court expressed a willingness to proscribe a merger if there was "any"
geographic market in which an anticompetitive effect could be shown. Id. at 549. For
a discussion of the Pabst decision, see notes 164-65 and accompanying text supra.
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hand, appears to prefer proof of an anticompetitive effect in a
particulargeographic market.
The language employed in United States v. Connecticut
National Bank, 17 decided the same day as Marine Bancorporation,
is illustrative of the Burger Court's position on geographic markets:
The Government repeatedly notes that it is not required to define
geographic markets by "metes and bounds." To the extent that
this means that such markets need not - indeed cannot - be
defined with scientific precision, it is accurate. But it is
nevertheless the Government's role to come forward with
evidence delineating the rough approximation of localized
banking markets mandated by ...
[PNB] and ... [Phillips31 s
burg].
The district court in the Connecticut National Bank case ruled that
the state as a whole was an appropriate geographic market within
which to measure the alleged anticompetitive effect of a merger
between two banks that were not competing directly. 319 The Supreme
Court disagreed, however, stating:
The State cannot be the relevant geographic market ...
because ... [the two banks] are not direct competitors ....
The
two banks do not operate statewide, nor do their customers as a
general rule utilize commercial banks on that basis....
Although the two banks presumably market a small percentage
of their loans to large customers on a statewide or broader basis,
it is undoubtedly true that almost all of their business originates
locally....
As indicated by our opinion today in Marine Bancorporation, the relevant geographic market of the acquired bank is the
localized area in which that bank is in significant, direct
320
competition with other banks, albeit not the acquiring bank.
Logically, the impact of most mergers should diminish statistically - by market share - as the size of the geographic area
increases. 321 Therefore, the Government usually has sought to limit
322
the size of the area within which the merger's impact is measured.
317. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
318. Id. at 669-70 (citations omitted), quoting United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966).
319. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240, 283 (D. Conn.
1973).
320. 418 U.S. at 667 (citation omitted).
321. See E. W. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 91-93 (2d ed. 1973).
322. Id. at 91. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
357-62 (1963). But see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-38 (1962).
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Where the parties to the merger are not direct competitors, however,
the Government has attempted to expand the market in order to
encompass both parties to the merger. 3 23 The Warren Court fostered
the Government's viewpoint by permitting this practice. 3 24 The
Burger Court, however, appeared to be of a different philosophical
bent when it held in Marine Bancorporation and Connecticut
National Bank that the rules governing direct competitor mergers
and nondirect competitor cases should be different. 32 5 Where parties
compete directly with one another, the elimination of competition
between them as a result of a merger may be sufficient to tend to
lessen competition substantially within the area where they do
business; but where the parties are not actual competitors, the
326
merger does not eliminate any competition between them.
Consequently, the Court in these two cases must necessarily be
concluding, that if no competition is eliminated between the parties
themselves, the merger cannot tend to lessen competition in any
area except the one in which the acquired bank does business.
This reasoning goes to the very heart of the "potential
competition" doctrine. As was indicated previously, 327 this doctrine
recognizes that a merger between two companies, one inside and the
other outside a given market, may have an anticompetitive effect
within the market even though the number of actual competitors
remains the same. Since the acquired and acquiring companies are
not direct competitors, the anticompetitive effect, if any, must be
measured vis-d-vis either or both of the merging companies and the
other competitors in the market. The anticompetitive effect of such a
merger could result from "entrenchment"; 328 or it could result from
the elimination of either an "actual

entrant" 33 0

' 329

or a "perceived potential

as a procompetitive force.

Cf. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1966) (Government
urged that the nation, a three-state area, and the State of Washington were all
relevant geographic markets).
323. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-38 (1962).
324. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1966);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357-62 (1963); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-38 (1962).
325. See text accompanying notes 315-20 supra.
326. Id.
327. See notes 166-93 & 245-48 and accompanying text supra.
328. "Entrenchment" may occur when a firm outside the market possesses such
overpowering resources that when it acquires a firm within the market it can
dominate its competitors. This danger is especially acute when the market is highly
concentrated or shielded by high barriers to entry. See note 351 infra.
329. An "actual potential entrant" is a firm that subjectively intends to enter the
market in some manner at some future time. Its entry by acquisition eliminates the
possibility of its entry de novo, and, therefore, eliminates the procompetitive benefits
that might have resulted from de novo entry.
330. A "perceived potential entrant" is a firm on the outer fringe of a market which
is viewed by firms within the market as one likely to enter. The fact that the firm is
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The Court in Marine Bancorporationwas unwilling to interpret

the potential competition doctrine this broadly. It construed the
doctrine to be applicable only to concentrated markets where the
dominant firms in the target market are "engaging in interdependent or parallel behavior and with the capacity effectively to

determine price and total output of goods or services.

' 331

The Court

agreed that the Government had adequately demonstrated that the
Spokane commercial banking market was structurally concentrated.3 3 2 Indeed, it acknowledged that "all banking markets in the
country are likely to be concentrated," 333 making them subject to the
potential competition doctrine.3 34 However, as the Court recognized,
the chief factor which makes the banking market concentrated regulatory barriers to entry - also renders demonstration of an
335
actual anticompetitive effect difficult.

Entry barriers protect existing firms from new competition.
Since they perceive no potential competitors where there are barriers

to entry, the existing firms are not likely to act procompetitively in
an effort to forestall market entry. In effect, there are no "perceived
potential competitors" in such a barricaded market. 33 6 Hence, the
acquisition of a firm within the market by a firm outside the market
cannot eliminate any procompetitive element, and, therefore, cannot

337
substantially lessen competition.
Such an acquisition would be unlawful only under a theory that

section 7 bars a merger whose sole effect upon competition is the

preclusion of the procompetitive effect that would result from de
not an "actual potential entrant" is irrelevant, because its competitive influence lies
in its being viewed by those within the market as a "potential entrant." See, e.g.,
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 559-60 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). In Falstaff, Justice Marshall stated:
From the perspective of the firms already in the market, the possibility of entry
by such a lingering firm may be an important consideration in their pricing and
marketing decisions. When the lingering firm enters the market by acquisition,
the competitive influence exerted by the firm is lost with no offsetting gain
through an increase in the number of companies seeking a share of the relevant
market. The result is a net decrease in competitive pressure.
Id.
331. 418 U.S. at 630. In limiting the scope of the potential competition doctrine, the
Court commented: "If the target market performed as a competitive market in
traditional antitrust terms, the participants in the market will have no occasion to
fashion their behavior to take into account the presence of a potential entrant." Id.
332. Id. at 632.
333. Id. (emphasis in original).
334. Id.
335. See id. In Marine Bancorporation,the Court discussed various provisions of
Washington state law that restricted de novo entry into the banking market. Id. at
609-12, citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§30.40.020, 30.08.020(7), 30.04.230 (Supp.
1973).
336. See note 330 supra.
337. See 418 U.S. at 639-40.
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novo entry or a toe-hold acquisition. 338 This issue, which the Court
left unresolved in Falstaff,339 constituted the Government's main

argument in Marine Bancorporation.340 Once again, the Court
declined to rule on the validity of this theory on the grounds that the
3 41
preconditions of the theory were not met.

In order for the theory to operate, according to the Court, it must
be determined: 1) that there is a feasible means for de novo or toehold entry into the target market; and 2) "that those means offer a
substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration of
that market or other significant procompetitive effects. '342 There
was considerable disagreement between the parties in Marine
Bancorporationas to the feasibility of de novo or toe-hold entry into
the Spokane banking market. 343 But nowhere did the Court hold that
such entry was not possible; rather the Court said that even
assuming arguendo that such entry were possible, it did not follow
that such "entry would be reasonably likely to produce any
significant procompetitive benefits" 344 or "long-term marketstructure benefits" 345 in the market.
After a brief discussion the Court also dismissed the Government's argument that the acquisition eliminated NBC as a perceived
potential entrant into the market. 3 46 According to the Court, since

the other commercial bankers in the area knew of the state
regulatory restraints against entry by NBC, "it is improbable that
NBC exerts any meaningful procompetitive influence over Spokane
banks by standing 'in the wings.'-347

Finally, the Court affirmed the district court's holding that there
was little likelihood that absent its acquisition by NBC, WTB would
have expanded outside its Spokane base and "develop[ed] into a
direct competitor with large Washington banks in other areas of the

338. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534 n.13 (1973). The

acquisition of a small firm is also referred to as a "foot-hold" acquisition. Id.; see note
243 supra.
339. 410 U.S. at 537; see text accompanying notes 249-51 supra.
340. 418 U.S. at 632-39.

341. Id.
342. Id. at 633.
343. Id.; see text accompanying notes 299-302 supra. Under Washington state law
NBC could not establish a de novo branch in Spokane, nor could its parent holding
company hold more than 25% of the stock of any other bank. See id. at 610-12, citing
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§30.40.020, 30.04.230 (Supp. 1973). NBC could enter the
Spokane market, therefore, only by acquisition of an existing bank. 418 U.S. at 633.
The Government contended, however, that NBC could sponsor and then acquire a
new bank or could acquire an existing bank smaller than WTB. Id. at 633-38.
344. 418 U.S. at 636.
345. Id. at 638.
346. Id. at 639-40; see note 305 and accompanying text supra.
347. 418 U.S. at 639-40.
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State." 348 The Court then concluded: "[I]n States where such
stringent barriers exist and in the absence of a likelihood of
entrenchment, the potential competition doctrine - grounded as it is
on relative freedom of entry on the part of the acquiring firm - will
seldom bar a geographic market extension merger by a commercial
bank."3 4 9
The acquisition of WTB by NBC would merely substitute NBC
for WTB in the Spokane area, leaving the number of competitors in
the market unchanged. 350 Absent an allegation that the merger
would produce entrenchment in the Spokane market, 35 1 there could
be no adverse competitive effect resulting from the merger in Marine
35 2
Bancorporation except under the potential competition doctrine.
The Court's decision thus turned on a question of judgment.
The Court clearly felt that the merger would not have an adverse
competitive effect. The impact of a potential entrant on competition
within a market is, of course, difficult to prove.3 53 Inevitably, the
more competitive the market is, the less the impact will be. As the
Court conceded, only in the case of a concentrated market is there
likely to be any impact at all.354 Moreover, that impact can only

range from no effect to a beneficial effect upon competition. It simply
cannot be adverse. Thus, when a firm's status as a potential entrant
is eliminated by an acquisition within the market, there are two
possible effects. At best, the acquisition has no impact on competition. This result occurs only if there was no market effect when the
acquiring firm maintained the posture of a potential entrant. In this
situation, one firm merely replaces another as a competitor in the
market. At worst, the acquisition has an anticompetitive effect. This
is the outcome if the acquiring firm exerted a procompetitive effect
as a potential entrant, because its entrance into the market
eliminates this beneficial impact. Moreover, assuming that a
potential entrant does not exert a procompetitive effect, 35 5 the impact
348.
(CCH)
349.
350.
351.

Id. at 640, citing United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 1973-1 Trade Cas.
74,496 at 94,246 (W.D. Wash. 1973).
418 U.S. at 641.
Id. at 605.
See note 328 and accompanying text supra. The Court stated in a footnote:
We put aside cases where an acquiring firm's market power, existing
capabilities, and proposed merger partner are such that the merger would
produce an enterprise likely to dominate the target market (a concept known as
entrenchment). There is no allegation that the instant merger would produce
entrenchment in the Spokane market.
418 U.S. at 623 n.23 (citations omitted).
352. See 418 U.S. at 605.
353. See id. at 632.
354. See id. at 624-25.
355. The Court in Marine Bancorporationreferred to the procompetitive influence
of a potential entrant as a "wings effect," because such a firm is said to be "standing
'in the wings.'" Id. at 639-40.
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of a "toe-hold" acquisition can also range only from no effect to a
beneficial effect. If the market is already concentrated, the
strengthening of one of the weaker competitors is likely to be
beneficial to some extent. Entry by a "toe-hold" acquisition is,
therefore, more beneficial than entry by acquisition of a market
leader.35 6 Finally, the effect of de novo entry is beneficial because it
clearly adds a new competitor to the market. De novo entry,
therefore, must necessarily be more beneficial than entry by
acquisition of a market leader.
Thus, when the Marine BancorporationCourt suggested that the
Government simply had not established the preconditions for the
potential competition theory,3 7 it was really saying that the
Government has not proved an adverse competitive effect. But,
assuming the validity of the theory reserved in Falstaff,358 the
logical effect of the acquisition had to be adverse. As a result, the
Court must have been deciding either that the theory was wrong, or
that the adverse effect of the acquisition was not "substantial."
Since the Court expressly refused to rule on the merits of the
theory,359 it was clearly concluding that the substantiality requirement of section 7 had not been satisfied. Indeed, the Court indicated
that the second precondition of the theory 360 had not been met when
it stated that the Government had failed to demonstrate that the
alternate means of entry offered a "reasonable prospect of long-term
' 36 1
structural improvement or other benefits in the target market.
This conclusion in Marine Bancorporationamply illustrates the
basic difference between the pro-antitrust philosophy of the Warren
Court, and the anti-antitrust view of the Burger Court. The Warren
Court accepted economic theory as proof of an adverse competitive
effect. 362 The Burger Court, however, requires clear proof of an
adverse competitive effect in each case, and it demands proof that
the effect will be "substantial." The failure to indicate the amount of
substantiality required and the type of proof that is acceptable
makes compliance with the Burger Court's requirement exceedingly
difficult.
356. The Marine BancorporationCourt actually seemed to feel that the acquisition
of WTB by NBC was procompetitive because it would "introduce a third full-service
banking organization to the Spokane market, where only two are now operating
.... "Id. at 639. Arguably, however, entry into the Spokane market by NBC by
another method would have been even more procompetitive, because it would have
added a new competitor as well.
357. Id.; see text accompanying notes 338-45 supra.
358. See text accompanying notes 249-51 & 338-39 supra.
359. 418 U.S. at 639; see text accompanying note 341 supra.
360. See text accompanying note 342 supra.
361. 418 U.S. at 638-39,
362. See, e.g., United States v. Philadephia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). For a
discussion of this case, see notes 98-135 and accompanying text supra.
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C. Section 7 Requires Proof of an Actual
Lessening of Competition
In Marine Bancorporation the Government argued that NBC
could have sponsored and subsequently acquired a new bank in the
Spokane market as an attempt to enter that market.363 Although the
defendants questioned the legality of this proposal under Washing-

365
ton state law, 36 4 the Court at that time declined to decide the issue.

In its 1974 term, however, the Court rejected a Government antitrust
challenge to such a scheme in United States v. Citizens and
3 66 In addition to the
Southern National Bank (C & S National).
section 7 issues, the case contained significant section 1 Sherman
36 7
Act aspects.
The State of Georgia restricted city banks from opening
suburban branches. 36 To circumvent the restrictions, the Citizens
and Southern National Bank (C & S) in Atlanta formed a bank
holding company, which embarked on a program of forming de facto
branches 36 9 in the suburbs. 370 Under the program, five percent of the
stock of the de facto branches was to be owned by the holding
company, 371 and the remaining stock was to be placed in the hands
of parties friendly to C & S.372 The branches were permitted to use
the C & S "logogram" and banking services, and were subject to
close C & S supervision and governance. 373 When Georgia law was
changed in 1970 to allow de jure branch banking countywide, 374 C &
S sought to absorb the five percent branches as true branches.3 75 The
Government brought suit, alleging that the acquisitions would
lessen competition in the relevant banking market in violation of
section 7. The Government also charged that the relations between C
& S and the five percent banks constituted unreasonable restraints
of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 376 The district
363. 418 U.S. at 633-34.
364. Id. at 634; see notes 335 & 343 supra.
365. 418 U.S. at 635.
366. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
367. Id. at 100-02.
368. Id. at 89.
369. A de facto branch bank is a bank that is legally a separate corporate entity,
but is operated as, and, in many respects, functions as, a branch bank of the
sponsoring bank.
370. Id. at 89.
371. Id. This amount of stock ownership represented the maximum allowed by
state law. See GA. CODE ANN. § 13-207(a)(2) (1967 & Supp. 1974) (current version at
GA. CODE ANN. § 13-207.1 (Supp. 1977)).
372. 422 U.S. at 89.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 94, citing GA. CODE ANN. § 13-203.1(a) (Supp. 1974). A de jure branch
bank is a legal branch that is not incorporated separately from the parent bank.
375. 422 U.S. at 90.
376. Id.
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court held against the Government on all issues, 377 and the Supreme
Court affirmed.

3 78

With respect to three of the C & S branches, the Court held that,
since they had been formed prior to July 1966, without any action
being taken against them by the Attorney General, they were
protected by the "grandfather" provision of the Bank Holding
Company Act, 379 which provides:

Any acquisition, merger, or consolidation of the kind
described in section 1842(a) of this title which was consummated
at any time prior or subsequent to May 9, 1956, and as to which
no litigation was initiated by the Attorney General prior to July
1, 1966, shall be conclusively presumed not to have been in
violation of any antitrust laws other than section 2 ... [of the
380
Sherman Act].

The Government raised two arguments against the use of this
statutory protection. First, it contended that the grandfather
provision did not apply to the instant case, because the relationship
between C & S and the five percent banks was not an "acquisition,
381
merger, or consolidation of the kind described in section 1842(a)."
Second, the Government asserted that it was not questioning the
initial acquisition of the five percent stock interest in the suburban
banks, but was challenging the resulting relationships that
eliminated all competition between them, and C & S's subsequent
38 2
acquisition of the remaining stock of the banks.
Addressing the Government's first contention, the Court held
that the formation of de facto branches could "fairly be characterized as an 'acquisition, merger, or consolidation of the kind described
in § 1842(a),' "383 even though it constitutes a "unique type of

377. United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 372 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ga. 1974).

378. 422 U.S. at 122.
379. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976).
380. Id. § 1849(d).

381. Brief for the United States at 47, United States v. Citzens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422
U.S. 86 (1975); see text accompanying note 380 supra. Section 1842(a), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(a) (1976), requires the prior approval of the Federal Reserve Board for certain
transactions by bank holding companies, including transactions tending to enlarge
holding company control of independent banks. See 422 U.S. at 103 & nn.14 & 15.
382. Brief for the United States at 32, United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
422 U.S. 86 (1975).
383. 422 U.S. at 109. The Court noted that:
[Section] 1842(a) was concerned with more than the literal "acquisition" of stock:
It took broad account of the "indirect" control of boards of directors "in any
manner," by bank holding companies. The grandfather provision creates
immunity under § 1 of the Sherman Act, not simply under § 7 of the Clayton Act,
an indication that its protection extends not merely to literal acquisitions,
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transaction." 38 4 Furthermore, noting that there had been no
"increase in C & S control, nor any change in the way it has been
exercised

'3 5

since the program was launched, the Court concluded

that the grandfather clause shielded the shift from de facto to de jure
38 6
branches from Government challenge.
In a final effort to defeat the use of the grandfather provision,
the Government alleged that, even if the transaction fell within the
scope of section 1842(a), C & S had not complied with the
requirements of that section.38 7 This argument was dismissed by the
Court with the simple assertion that that question was "not relevant
to our inquiry." 388 Thus, the Court was affording C & S the benefit of
the grandfather provision, not only in the face of its doubtful
applicability, but also in spite of C & S's noncompliance with the
provision.

389

In what can only be described as understatement, Justice
Brennan's dissent referred to the Court's holding on the grandfather
clause as "plainly a distorted expansion . . . beyond its language

and purpose." 390 According to Justice Brennan, the grandfather
provision had been enacted in response to the PNB391 and
Lexington 92 decisions, which interpreted section 7 and section 1
more broadly than had previous cases. Therefore, the dissent
maintained that the grandfather provision merely protected those
who had justifiably relied on prior interpretations from liability
under those sections. 393 It was not designed to "provide sanctuary
mergers, and consolidations, but also to "restraints of trade" simultaneous with
and functionally integral to such transactions.
Id. at 109-10 (footnote omitted).
384. Id. at 109.
385. Id. at 110.
386. Id. at 110-11.
387. Reply Brief for the United States at 10, United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975). Under §1842(a), it is unlawful to make any of the
acquisitions covered by that section without the prior approval of the Federal Reserve
Board. See id. C & S, however, had neither sought nor obtained the required approval.
Id.
388. 422 U.S. at 110.
389. See id. at 110 n.19.
390. Id. at 132 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
391. For a discussion of PNB, see notes 98-135 and accompanying text supra.
392. For a discussion of this case, see notes 136-42 and accompanying text supra.
393. 422 U.S. at 132-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan explained:
PhiladelphiaNationalBank rejected a literal interpretation of § 7 of the Clayton
Act that would have limited its application to stock acquisitions by banks, an
interpretation that nevertheless enjoyed some acceptance prior to the decision.
Congress was concerned about the difficulty of unscrambling pre-Philadelphia
National Bank mergers undertaken in reliance upon the literal interpretation of
§ 7 which the Court ultimately rejected, and accordingly immunized them from
suit under that section. But a provision barring suit under § 1 of the Sherman Act
was also necessary to safeguard the same mergers because of our decision in
Lexington Bank.
Id. at 135 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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for then-challenged price-fixing, market-division, or other cartel
activity by banks. '394 This discussion by the dissent aptly illustrates
that the Burger Court majority is as ingenious as the Warren Court
was in molding the language and purpose of the antitrust law to
achieve the result desired.
Three of the five percent banks in C & S National had been
formed after July 1, 1966 and were, therefore, clearly beyond the
protection of the grandfather provision of the Bank Holding
Company Act. 395 Thus, the Court was forced to determine the
legality of these de facto branches under section 1. The Government
alleged a section 1 violation because the branches did not compete
with C & S even though they were legally distinct corporate
entities. 396 It was conceded by the Court that C & S's de facto
branches did not behave as active competitors, with respect either to
each other or to C & S and its majority-owned affiliates. 39 The Court
also granted: "Were we dealing with independent competitors
having no permissible reason for intimate and continuous cooperation and consultation as to almost every facet of doing business, the
evidence adduced here might well preclude a finding that the parties
were not engaged in a conspiracy to affect prices. '398 Recognizing
that the de facto branches were "a direct response to Georgia's
historic restrictions on de jure branching," 399 the Court observed
that "the question . . . remains whether restraints of trade integral
to this particular, unusual function are unreasonable. '' 400 This

statement alone is of enormous antitrust significance for it suggests
that certain practices -

as per se
reason.

offenses, 40 1

such as price fixing - heretofore regarded

are now to be examined under the rule of

394. Id. at 134-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
395. Id. at 111. See text accompanying note 380 supra.
396. 422 U.S. at 112. The Government asserted that the branching arrangements
"actually encompassed at least a tacit agreement to fix interest rates and service
charges, so as to make the interrelationships - to that extent at least - illegal 'per
se.'" Id. (citations omitted).
397. Id. The Court noted that, if the branches had been de jure branches of C & S,
the entire group of relationships would have been beyond attack. Id.
398. Id. at 113-14.
399. Id. at 116.
400. Id., citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
401. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). In
Socony, the Court unequivocally stated: "[F]or over forty years this Court has
consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing
agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act .... " Id. at 218.
The C & S NationalCourt's citation to Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918) is interesting. See note 400 and accompanying text supra. In
Socony, the Court distinguished Chicago Board of Trade because the arrangement
there had not been "aimed at price manipulation or the control of the market prices
and . . . it had 'no appreciable effect on general market prices'...." 310 U.S. at 217.
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The Court then concluded that C & S's de facto branching
program was plainly procompetitive since it provided competition
for the other suburban banks. 0 2 Therefore, the Court held: "in the
face of the stringent state restrictions on branching" - which must
be viewed as anticompetitive - "C & S's program of founding new
de facto branches, and maintaining them as such, did not infringe
'40 3
§ 1 of the Sherman Act.
Having found no section 1 violation, the Court then allowed C &
S to lift itself by its own boot straps to avoid a section 7 violation as
well. 44 Given the lack of competition between the five percent banks
and C & S before the transformation into de jure branches, the Court
stated that it "indisputably follows that the proposed acquisitions
will extinguish no present competitive conduct or relationships.

' 40°5

With respect to the acquisition's possible elimination of future
competition, the Court simply remarked that there was no "realistic
prospect that denial of these acquisitions would lead the defendant
40 6
banks to compete against each other."
Inherent in the Court's approach was the idea that, if C & S
could legally have established de jure branches at the outset without
running afoul of the Sherman or Clayton Acts, there was no reason
for the Court to find an antitrust violation simply because C & S
could not legally branch into the suburbs at the time it established
the five percent banks. 407 Since the economic effect was the same, the
Court apparently felt that the manner in which the branching was
accomplished was not determinative. The same type of reasoning
had been employed by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc. 40

The Court there declared a

horizontal territorial market division among members of a grocery
association involving private label brands owned by the association
per se unlawful. 40 9 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger
commented:

402. 422 U.S. at 119.
403. Id. at 119-20.
404. Id. at 120-22.
405. Id. at 121.
406. Id.
407. See id. at 111-12, 117-18. For example, the Court at one point utilized the
following language:
C & S was absolutely restrained by state law from reaching the suburban market
through the preferred process of internal expansion. De facto branching was the
closest available substitute. ...
To characterize these relationships as an unreasonable restraint of trade is
to forget that their whole purpose and effect were to defeat a restraint of trade.
Id. at 117-18 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
408. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
409. Id. at 608.
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The national chains market their own private-label products, and these products are available nowhere else than in the
stores of those chains. The stores of any one chain, of course, do
not engage in price competition with each other with respect to
their chain's private-label brands, and no serious suggestion
could be made that the Sherman Act requires otherwise. I fail to
see any difference whatsoever in the economic effect of the
Topco arrangement for the marketing of Topco-brand products
and the methods used by the national chains in marketing their
private-label brands. True, the Topco arrangement involves a
"combination," while each of the national chains is a single
integrated corporation. The controlling consideration, however,
should be that in neither case is the policy of the Sherman Act
offended for the practices in both cases work to the benefit, and
4 10
not to the detriment, of the consuming public.
The Chief Justice's inability "to see any difference" illustrates the
basic problem with the reasoning of the Burger Court. That Court
fails to recognize that the antitrust laws make the achievement of an
objective unlawful if accomplished by a particular means. And as
long as that means is used, its comparative effect is irrelevant under
a per se rule. Moreover, the "difference" that Chief Justice Burger
professed an inability to perceive in Topco is no more complicated
than the difference between inheritance and larceny as a means of
achieving wealth.
D. Section 7 Requires That Both Corporations
Be Engaged in Interstate Commerce
In United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries,411 the Supreme Court was presented, for the first time, with the
question of whether the acquisition of an intrastate corporation by
an interstate corporation was within the prohibition of section 7.412
In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the Court held that section
7 does not proscribe a corporate acquisition, regardless of its effect
upon interstate commerce, unless both corporations operate interstate businesses.413 On an examination of the language of section 7,
414
the Court concluded that the phrase "engaged in commerce"
requires that both corporations "be directly engaged in the
production, distribution, or acquisition of goods or services in
interstate commerce.

' 415

410. Id. at 623 n.13 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
411. 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
412. Id. at 275. For the pertinent text of § 7, see note 68 supra.

413. 422 U.S. at 283.
414. See note 68 supra.
415. 422 U.S. at 283.
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American Building Maintenance Industries (ABM Industries),
the acquiring corporation, was the largest supplier of janitorial
services in Southern California, as well as one of the largest
suppliers of janitorial services in the country.41 6 Both of the acquired
corporations, J. E. Benton Management Corp. and Benton Maintenance Co. (Benton companies) also supplied janitorial services in
Southern California.1 7 Although the Benton companies serviced
customers who were engaged in interstate commerce, that service
was performed entirely within California by labor recruited solely
from the local labor market in Southern California."" Some of the
equipment and supplies used by the Benton companies were
manufactured outside California, but they were purchased primarily
-

but not exclusively -

41 9
from local distributors.

On these facts, the Court concluded that the Benton companies
were neither "engaged in commerce" nor engaged in the flow of
interstate commerce as required under section 7.42 0 According to the
Court, "[t]o be engaged 'in commerce' within the meaning of section
7, a corporation must itself be directly engaged in the production,
distribution, or acquisition of goods or services in interstate
commerce. '421 It is important to recognize that this was a judicial
interpretation of section 7 uttered for the first time in this case.
Apparently, under the American Building Maintenance test, a
corporation is subject to the prohibitions of section 7, only if a
sufficient number of transactions cross state lines. Neither buying
from or selling to a corporation engaged in commerce, nor buying an
article produced in commerce satisfies this requirement, for the
Benton companies did all three. 422 The Court's language suggests
that the result in the case might have been otherwise if the Benton
companies had merely purchased their supplies directly from an outof-state supplier. 423 If the Court's reading of congressional intent
was accurate, it must be questioned why Congress would have
desired different results for acquisitions of companies that purchase
from another state and acquisitions of companies that buy within
the state. One must also marvel at the anomaly that, had the Benton
companies and ABM Industries merely eliminated price competition
among themselves by setting uniform prices, the rigorous standard
of section 1 of the Sherman Act would have been violated, while the
416. Id. at 273.
417. Id. at 274.
418. Id.
419. Id. & 274 n.4.

420. Id. at 283-85.
421. Id. at 283.

422. See text accompanying notes 418 & 419 supra.
423. See text accompanying note 421 supra.
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complete takeover of the Benton companies by ABM Industries,
which eliminated all competition between them, did not violate the
less rigorous standard of section 7424
The Court asserted that its decision was compelled by the literal
language and legislative history of the Clayton Act, and prior
decisions interpreting the "in commerce" language. 425 It is submitted
that the Court's compulsion was subjective and internal, being
dictated only by a distinct anti-antitrust bias.
Justice Stewart took pains to characterize the Court's action as
nothing more than a literal construction of the "in commerce"
requirement of section 7.426 In various portions of his opinion, he

4 27
"narrow," 428
described the "in commerce" language as "explicit,"
"distinct, "429 "precise, '430 and "express. ' 431 Although Humpty

Dumpty might have applauded the Court's exercise of its power to
make words stand for whatever it pleases, 432 even he would have
'433
acknowledged that they "have no inherently proper meanings.
Contrary to the Court's assumption, nothing in the language of
section 7 suggests that the "commerce" language of section 7 was
intended by Congress to have a meaning different from the
"commerce" language of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 434 Contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies "in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations

' 435

are proscribed

by section 1 of the Sherman Act. Likewise, section 1 of the Clayton
Act expressly defines "commerce" as "trade or commerce among the
several States and with foreign nations .... "136Nevertheless, the
Court dismissed the virtually identical language of the two statutes
by merely stating: "The phrase 'in commerce' does not, of course,
424. The Court apparently justified this anomalous result by noting that the
commerce requirement for § 1 of the Sherman Act was very broad. 422 U.S. at 278; see
text accompanying note 446 infra.
425. 422 U.S. at 275-83.
426. Id. at 282.
427. Id. at 275, 279.
428. Id. at 276.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 278.
431. Id.
432. See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS. A brief dialogue from
that classic may illuminate this point:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many
different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's
all."

Id.Ch. 6.
433. R.

DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS

OF LEGAL DRAFrING

13 (1965).

434. See 422 U.S. at 278.
435. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); see note 17 supra.
436. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976); see note 450 infra.
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necessarily have a uniform meaning whenever used by Congress. '43
This observation may undoubtedly be true; but a mere judicial
pronouncement does not prove that the two sections were intended to
have different meanings, especially when Congress used similar
language in both.
The American Building Maintenance Court attempted to support
its construction of the "in commerce" language of section 7 by
distinguishing the reach of section 1 of the Sherman Act from that of
section 7. The Court concluded that since section 1 prohibits any
contract, combination, or conspiracy "in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, ' 438 its jurisdictional reach "is
keyed directly to effects on interstate markets and the interstate flow
of goods. ' '439 However, the Court determined that section 7 evidences
"[n]o similar concern for the impact of intrastate conduct on
interstate commerce" 440 because Congress imposed an "engaged in
commerce" requirement for jurisdiction over a corporate acquisition. 44' The distinction drawn by the Court appears to be between an
interstate effect and an interstate entity. The Court's interpretation
of section 1 implies that the character of the entities is irrelevant if
the effect is interstate; whereas its construction of section 7 suggests
that the character of the effect is irrelevant so long as the entities are
42
interstate.
The Court further buttressed its position by comparing the
language of section 1 with the precise "in commerce" phrase of
section 7.443 In attempting to highlight the distinction between the
two sections, the Court affirmed its discussion in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Copp Paving Co., 444 of the broad scope of section 1. 44 5 In Copp, the
Court stated:
[C]ases have recognized that in enacting § 1 Congress "wanted
to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in
437. 422 U.S. at 277.
438. Id. at 278, quoting § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
439. 422 U.S. at 278 (emphasis added), quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,
419 U.S. 186, 194 (1974).
440. 422 U.S. at 278.
441. Id.
442. See FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941). The Court in American Building
Maintenance relied heavily upon Bunte Bros. in its decision. See 422 U.S. at 276-77,
281. In Bunte Bros., the Court construed in a similar manner the "in commerce"
language of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976). See 312
U.S. at 354-55. In that case, however, the Court also said that the character of the
entity and the effect were irrelevant, as long as the activity was interstate. Id. at
351-53.
443. 422 U.S. at 278.

444. 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
445. 422 U.S. at 278.
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restraining trust and monopoly agreements . . . ." Consistently
with this purpose and with the plain thrust of the statutory
language, the Court has held that, however local its immediate
object, a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" nonetheless
may constitute a restraint within the meaning of 1 if it
446
substantially and adversely affects interstate commerce.
This writer finds it difficult to square the Court's interpretation
with the actual language of the two statutes, for the Court seems to
be concluding that section 1 of the Sherman Act is coextensive with

the reach of the commerce clause of the Constitution, 447 while section
7 is not. A comparison of the language of the-two sections, however,
defies that interpretation. If section 1 of the Sherman Act is fully
coextensive with Congress' power under the commerce clause, then

section 3 of the Sherman Act, 448 which applies the language of

449
section 1 to United States Territories and the District of Columbia,
is redundant.
Furthermore, the Clayton Act definition of "commerce" is as
broad as the commerce specified in both sections 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Act. 450 Therefore, if section 3 is not redundant, "commerce"
under the Clayton Act must be broader in scope than that of section
1, not narrower. Even if section 3 is redundant, the Court's
discussion does not adequately explain why "commerce" under the
Clayton Act is narrower than under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The only rational justification for the American Building
Maintenance Court's distinction between the two statutes, therefore,
must rest upon the tenuous and judicially developed distinction

446. 419 U.S. at 194-95 (emphasis added), quoting United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944).
447. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
448. 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
449. Id. Section 3 provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the
District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such
Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any

State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between
the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is declared
illegal.

Id.
450. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976). Section 1 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
"Commerce," as used herein, means trade or commerce among the several
States and with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia or any
Territory of the United States and any State, Territory, or foreign nation, or
between any insular possessions or other places under the jurisdiction of the
United States, or between any such possession or place and any State or
Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia or any foreign nation,
or within the District of Columbia or any Territory or any insular possession or
other place under the jurisdiction of the United States: Provided, That nothing in
this Act contained shall apply to the Philippine Islands.
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between "in commerce" and "affecting commerce."45 ' The Court
simply did not find persuasive the Government's argument that "the
legislative history of the Clayton Act

. .

. demonstrates that the 'in

commerce' language of § 7 was intended to be coextensive with the
' '452
reach of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
The Court itself cited nothing in the legislative history of the
Clayton Act prior to its 1950 amendment to show the intent of
Congress to limit the reach of section 7 to less than Congress' full
power under the Commerce Clause. Indeed, the Court apparently
considered the intent of the Congress that enacted the Clayton Act
in 1914 to be irrelevant when it commented:
[W]hether or not Congress in enacting the Clayton Act in 1914
intended to exercise fully its power to regulate commerce, and
whatever the understanding of the 63d Congress may have been
as to the extent of its Commerce Clause power, the fact is that
when § 7 was re-enacted in 1950, the phrase "engaged in
of art, indicating a
commerce" had long since become a term
453
limited assertion of federal jurisdiction.

The Court emphasized Congress' 1950 amendment to section 7,
which continued the "in commerce" limitation. 45 4 This action of the
Congress, said the Court, could be "rationally explained only in
terms of a legislative intent, at least in 1950, not to apply the rather
drastic prohibitions of § 7 of the Clayton Act to the full range of
corporations potentially subject to the commerce power. '455 Justice
Stewart's majority opinion in American Building Maintenance did
not, however, reveal the possible congressional reasons for excluding
the acquisition of a corporation that does not produce, buy, or sell
goods or services in interstate commerce from the reach of section 7.
Perhaps Congress felt a certain solicitude for small intrastate
businesses, and wanted to shield them from the reach of some
federal regulation; but this protective attitude cannot explain why
Congress would draft a statute that would permit the acquisition of
these firms by interstate businesses.
The Government in American Building Maintenance contended
that "it would be anomalous for Congress to have strengthened the
antitrust laws by curing perceived deficiencies in the Sherman Act
and at the same time to have limited the jurisdictional scope of those
451. See notes 438-42 and accompanying text supra.
452. 422 U.S. at 277-78.
453. Id. at 279-80. At this point the Court once again drew upon Bunte Bros. for
support. Id. at 280; see note 442 supra.
454. 422 U.S. at 281; see notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
455. 422 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added).
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remedial provisions ....,,456 Justice Stewart, however, justified the
Court's restrictive interpretation of the reach of section 7 by noting
the explicit congressional limitation of that section to corporate
acquisitions. 457 The Court noted that although the Sherman Act
reaches contracts, combinations and conspiracies by partnerships
and natural persons as well as corporations, section 7 clearly does
not apply to the "allegedly anticompetitive acquisition[s] of
partnership assets. ' 458 Yet, it is submitted that this limitation can be
explained by the possible congressional concern with the freedom of
the owners of a partnership or sole proprietorship to sell a business
and retire. Or it may be that Congress did not contemplate that
anything other than a corporation would be large enough to create
an anticompetitive effect upon its acquisition. It is even conceivable
that Congress wanted to limit the scope of the antitrust laws to those
corporations within the jurisdiction of the Commerce Clause.
However, the Court in American Building Maintenance failed to
articulate its reason for concluding that Congress did not intend to
prohibit anticompetitive mergers between corporations that clearly
fall within the jurisdiction of the Commerce Clause.
Finally, the Court found no mandate in the remedial purpose of
section 7 to construe "corporations engaged in commerce" to
encompass corporations affecting commerce.4 59 According to the
Court, Congress clearly intended section 7 to reach only certain
types of acquisitions, and there was no justification for disregarding
these limitations. 46 0 Of course, the Court's decisional process begged
the question, for the issue was whether "corporations. engaged in
commerce" imposed a limitation other than on "corporations," and
not whether that limitation should have been disregarded. The
Court, in effect, assumed that this language was a limitation on
jurisdiction by deciding that it should not be disregarded. Were the
Court unhampered by an anti-antitrust bias, it would have examined
only the question of whether the remedial purpose of section 7 is
consistent with the view that "engaged in commerce" is a
jurisdictional limitation.
The Burger Court's treatment of the jurisdictional issue is in
sharp contrast to the Warren Court's treatment of the same issue in
4 61
In deciding whether a newly formed corporation not
Penn-Olin.
yet conducting business was "engaged" in commerce for purposes of
456. Id. at 278.
457. Id. at 279.
458.
459.
460.
461.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 279; see text accompanying notes 457-58 supra.
For a discussion of Penn-Olin,see notes 173-85 and accompanying text supra.
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section 7's jurisdictional reach, 462 the Warren Court said that "[t]he
test of the section is the effect of the acquisition.

'463

Furthermore,

the Court determined that "the economic effects of an acquisition are
to be measured at [the time of suit] . . . rather than at the time of
acquisition. 4 64 Applying this standard to Penn-Olin, the Court
concluded that "long prior to trial, [the corporation] was actually
engaged in commerce .... "P465
This author finds Penn-Olin and American Building Maintenance irreconciliable on the question of jurisdiction. If a corporation
not yet operating a business is considered to be "engaged in
commerce," it is difficult to understand why a corporation actually
conducting business is not also considered to be so "engaged." In
other words, if a corporation doing nothing in commerce satisfies the
jurisdictional requirement, a viable, active corporation that affects
commerce should also. It is possible to seize upon the Court's
reasoning in Penn-Olin that "the fact that [the corporation] ... was
organized specifically to engage in commerce should bring it within
the coverage of § 7. ' '466 Concededly, an intent to engage in commerce
could serve to distinguish the two cases. However, if the acquisition
of an intrastate corporation by an interstate corporation transforms
the intrastate firm into an interstate subsidiary for section 7
purposes, then at the time of suit both corporations would be
engaged in commerce, and the technical requirement of section 7
would be met. Moreover, if the pleadings did not originally reflect the
conversion of the acquired company into an interstate corporation,
an amended complaint could be filed at the time of trial even though
46 7
the Penn-Olin Court considered it to be a useless requirement.
If the intrastate corporation is not transformed into an
interstate corporation upon its acquisition, an anomaly appears
possible under the American Building Maintenance holding.46 8
Section 7 would be violated if another interstate corporation
acquired the stock of the intrastate corporation; but no violation
would occur if the assets of the intrastate corporation were acquired.
This contradictory treatment would occur because the stock of the
intrastate corporation - but not the assets - becomes an asset of
the parent upon acquisition.4 6 9 Therefore, if the stock was later sold
378 U.S. at 167-68.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
468. See notes 416-21 and accompanying text supra.

462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.

469. Although, in effect, the parent owns the assets of the acquired corporation now a subsidiary - technically, the assets of the subsidiary are not the assets of the
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by the interstate parent to another corporation "engaged in
commerce," the acquiring corporation would be receiving an asset
from a corporation "engaged also in commerce," and the section 7
requirement would be met. However, since the assets of an acquired
corporation technically do not become the assets of the parent, a
subsequent purchase of the assets would not satisfy the commerce
requirement of section 7. This anomaly becomes even more bizarre
when it is remembered that the purpose of the 1950 amendment which, according to Justice Stewart in American Building Maintenance indicated a congressional intent to limit the reach of section
4 71
was to treat stock and asset acquisitions alike.
7470 V.

THE BURGER COURT'S TREATMENT OF OTHER ANTITRUST
AREAS AND THE FUTURE

The implications of the merger cases decided during the 1973
and 1974 terms of the Burger Court are obvious. But a brief
examination of other areas of antitrust law may prove to be equally
illuminating. Since it is the purpose of this article to speculate on the
possible impact of the anti-antitrust bias of the Burger Court, an
analysis of the Court's holdings in other antitrust areas will be
helpful. Clues as to what lies ahead may be found in most of the
recent major antitrust decisions.
The Burger Court has shown a strong tendency to discard the
"simplified test of illegality" followed by the Warren Court. 47 2 The
new majority has rejected the Government's use of statistics and
market shares to demonstrate a probable anticompetitive effect,
requiring instead proof of a present anticompetitive impact1 7 3 This
philosophical shift suggests that future antitrust cases will increasingly be decided under the rule of reason approach, rather than
under the per se rule.
The conflict over which standard of illegality to use flared
during the transition period in Topco. 474 Justice Marshall, speaking
parent. The stock of the subsidiary only is an asset of the parent. For example, if the
subsidiary wishes to sell some of its assets, the subsidiary alone could pass good title,
since it is the true owner of those assets.
470. See 422 U.S. at 280-81.
471. See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE
CONG. SERV. 4293-94. See also text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
472. See text accompanying notes 27 & 126 supra. But see Williams, Corporate
Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 26 MERCER L. REV. 963 (1975). The author there
contends that the Burger Court has merely altered the Government's burden of proof,
and has not radically reversed the trends of the Warren Court. Id. at 974.
473. Accord, Williams, supra note 472, at 974. See, e.g., United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-500 (1974). For a discussion of this case, see text
accompanying notes 262-96 supra.
474. See notes 408-10 and accompanying text supra.
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for the Court, aptly expressed the advantage of the per se approach:
"[C]ourts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic
problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense,
destruction of competition in one sector of the economy against
promotion of competition in another sector is one important reason
we have formulated per se rules." 75 He also added in a footnote:
Without the per se rules, businessmen would be left with
little to aid them in predicting in any particular case what courts
will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act. Should
Congress ultimately determine that predictability is unimportant in this area of the law, it can, of course, make per se rules
inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts free to ramble
through the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a
476
flexible approach.
In his dissent in Topco, Chief Justice Burger argued against the
promulgation of any new per se rules, and criticized the Court for
adopting one "without regard to the impact that the condemned
practices may have on competition."' 4 77 The dissent maintained
"that it was Congress' intent that a 'rule of reason' be applied in
making such case-by-case determinations. ' 478 Moreover, Chief
Justice Burger emphasized that "the per se rules that have been
developed . . . are complementary to, and in no way inconsistent
with, the rule of reason."4 79 The per se rules are valuable, he noted,
because "enforcement and predictability are enhanced and ...
unnecessary judicial investigation is avoided . . . .,"8 The dissent
criticized the Topco majority for emphasizing "only the importance
of predictability ' 48 1 in formulating a new per se rule without
determining whether the condemned practice had some "'pernicious
effect on competition'" and lacked "'any redeeming virtue.' "482
Suggesting that the majority should not hesitate to analyze complex
economic problems under the rule of reason, 48 3 Chief Justice Burger
asserted: "We can undoubtedly ease our task, but we should not
abdicate [our] . . . role by formulation of per se rules with no
475. 405 U.S. at 609-10 (footnote omitted).
476. Id. at 609-10 n.10.
477. Id. at 620 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent felt that the majority should
have been willing to assess the economic impact of the challenged practice on the
record of the case. Id.
478. Id. at 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 622 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
482. Id., quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
483. 405 U.S. at 622 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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justification other than the enhancement of predictability and the
' 48 4
reduction of judicial investigation."
Establishing an antitrust violation is more difficult under a rule
of reason approach than under a per se rule for two reasons. First, it
shifts the focus from "conduct" to "effect." Thus, specific evidence,
which is often impossible to obtain, must be introduced to
demonstrate that effect. Second, since the relevant effect is a future
probable effect, it is in reality a prediction or matter of judgment. If a
court possesses a philosophical bias against the antitrust laws, it is
less likely to conclude that the future effect is sufficiently probable to
support an antitrust violation.
Given the Burger Court's dissatisfaction with per se rules, the
Government and other antitrust plaintiffs will be required to bear a
more rigorous burden of proof in the future. The Court thus far seems
to be inclined to demand proof of an actual restraint of trade - the
standard of section 1 of the Sherman Act - even in cases under
85
section 7, where the language seems to require mere probabilities.1
The Burger Court's hostility to section 7 also portends serious
consequences for section 1 of the Sherman Act. If two companies can
terminate all competition between themselves by merging without
violating the incipiency standard of section 7, it is doubtful that an
agreement to eliminate only one aspect of competition will be held
unlawful under the more rigorous restraint of trade standard of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. In other words, based on the Court's
decisions in section 7 cases, it would be entirely logical for the Court
to conclude that section 1 of the Sherman Act should not bar an
agreement between two companies that could lawfully merge under
section 7. Of course, it would probably represent too great a break
with precedent for the Burger Court to hold that section 1 of the
86
Sherman Act was not violated if the parties in GeneralDynamics,
87 or Marine Bancorporation48
American Building Maintenance,
had agreed merely to fix prices rather than to merge. Nevertheless,
where the challenged arrangement or agreement is not simply a
blatant price-fixing scheme, the Court may well resort to the rule of

484. Id.
485. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974). For a
discussion of this point in Marine Bancorporation,see text accompanying note 362
supra.
486. For a discussion of General Dynamics, see notes 262-96 and accompanying
text supra.
487. For a discussion of this case, see notes 411-71 and accompanying text supra.
488. For a discussion of Marine Bancorporation, see notes 299-362 and accompanying text supra.
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reason standard and consider possible justifications for the chal4 9
lenged practices.
The Court's treatment of the section 1 Sherman Act issues in C
& S National4 ' indicates that the Court may return to the rule of
reason approach and examine the anticompetitive impact of certain
practices that were held per se unlawful by the Warren Court.
Indeed, the Court has already begun to move in this direction.
A.

Vertical Resale Restrictions

In 1963, in White Motor Co. v. United States, 491 the Supreme
Court refused to apply a per se rule to vertical resale restrictions.
Consequently, the Court reversed the district court's summary
judgment against a manufacturer who had imposed vertical resale
492
restrictions on its dealers as to territory and customer selection.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, concluded that the Court
did "not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of
which these arrangements emerge to be certain" that the arrangements were unreasonable as a matter of law.4 93
Four years later, the Warren Court decided United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.4 94 The product distribution system used by

Arnold, Schwinn & Company (Schwinn), the leading domestic
manufacturer of bicycles, was at issue in this case. 495 Schwinn

assigned exclusive territories to its distributors, who were instructed
to sell only to authorized Schwinn retailers in their respective
territories. 496 At trial, the Government asserted that Schwinn's
territorial and customer limitations were per se unlawful under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 97 The district court agreed, but only
as to products that Schwinn sold outright to distributors. 498 As to

products that Schwinn conveyed to distributors on an agency or
consignment basis, the district court held that the territorial and
customer restrictions were lawful. 499 When the Government appealed
this latter determination to the Supreme Court, it dropped the
489. See Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L.
REv.625 (1966).
490. For a discussion of the Court's examination of the alleged price-fixing scheme
under the rule of reason standard, see text accompanying notes 395-403 supra.
491. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
492. Id. at 263.
493. Id.
494. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
495. Id. at 368-70.
496. Id. at 371.
497. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 326 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
498. Id. at 342.
499. Id. at 334.
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contention that the distribution limitations were a per se violation of
section 1. Instead, the Government asked the Court to use the rule
of reason approach to conclude, on the basis of a voluminous record,
that the limitations constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade."°1
The Court, speaking through Justice Fortas, held that vertical
territorial resale restrictions were per se illegal where the manufacturer sold his product to the distributor.502 However, according to the
Court:
Where the manufacturer retains title, dominion, and risk with
respect to the product and the position and function of the dealer
in question are, in fact, indistinguishable from those of an agent
or salesman of the manufacturer, it is only if the impact of the
confinement is "unreasonably" restrictive of competition that a
violation of § 1 results from such confinement, unencumbered by
culpable price fixing.503
On the record before it, the Court could not conclude "that Schwinn's
franchising of retailers and its confinement of retail sales to them
'' s°4
. ..constitute an 'unreasonable' restraint of trade.

Justice Stewart concurred in part and dissented in part.505 He
criticized the majority for sua sponte creating a new per se rule when
the issue had not been addressed to the Court,506 stating:
Despite the Government's concession that the rule of reason
applies to all aspects of Schwinn's distribution system, the Court
nevertheless reaches out to adopt a potent per se rule. No
previous antitrust decision of this Court justifies its action.
Instead, it completely repudiates the only case in point, White
Motor... . The Court today is unable to give any reasons why,
only four years later, this precedent should be overruled. Surely,
we have not in this short interim accumulated sufficient new
experience or insight to justify embracing a rule automatically
500. 388 U.S. at 368.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 379. The Court explained:
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to
seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded
after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it. Such restraints are so
obviously destructive of competition that their mere existence is enough.
Id. (emphasis added), citing White Motor Co.v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), and
Dr. Miles Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The Court's citation to White
Motor Co. seems unusual in light of the Court's refusal in that case to apply a per se
rule to a similar arrangement. See text accompanying notes 491-93 supra. See also
text accompanying note 507 infra.
503. 388 U.S. at 380.
504. Id. at 381.
505. Id. at 382 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
506. Id. at 394 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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invalidating any vertical restraints in a 5distribution
system
07
based on sales to wholesalers and retailers.
In the final days of the Burger Court's 1976 term the per se rule of
Schwinn was expressly overruled in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc.508 The case raised the question of the legality of a
"location clause" in a franchise agreement.5s 9
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, had distinguished Schwinn
from the instant case on the basis of the type of vertical restraint
involved.5 10 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the rule
51 1
of reason rather than the per se rule of Schwinn should apply.
Although the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's distinction
between Schwinn and Sylvania,5 1 2 it decided not to extend the

Schwinn rule to location clauses.51 3 Instead, the Court overruled the
per se rule of Schwinn, stating:
[D]eparture from the rule of reason standard must be based upon
demonstrable economic effect rather than - as in Schwinn upon formalistic line drawing.
... When competitive effects are shown to result from
particular vertical restrictions they can be adequately policed
under the rule of reason, the standard traditionally applied for
the majority of anticompetitive practices challenged under § 1 of
514
the [Sherman] Act.

B.

Horizontal Resale Restrictions

The Burger Court's acceptance of the theory that, even though
vertical restrictions may reduce intrabrand competition, they
507. Id. at 388-89 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted).
508. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
509. Id. at 37. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc. (Sylvania) manufactured and sold television sets
to a group of franchised retailers. Id. at 38. The Court's discussion of the location clauses
at issue indicated that: "Sylvania limited the number of franchises granted for any given
area and required each franchisee to sell his Sylvania products only from the location or
locations at which he was franchised." Id.
510. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continential T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1000 (9th Cir.
1976) (en banc). The Supreme Court briefly described the rationale of the Ninth
Circuit's distinction as follows: "Contrasting the nature of the restrictions, their
competitive impact, and the market shares of the franchisors in the two cases, the
court concluded that Sylvania's location restriction had less potential for competitive
" 433 U.S. at 41
harm than the [customer] restrictions invalidated in Schwinn ..
(emphasis added), citing GTE Sylvania, Inc., v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980
(9th Cir. 1976).
511. 537 F.2d at 1000.
512. 433 U.S. at 46. The Court was "unable to find a principled basis for
Id.; see text accompanying notes 544-46 infra.
distinguishing Schwinn .
513. 433 U.S. at 57.
514. Id. at 58-59.
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inevitably promote interbrand competition led to the repudiation of
the Schwinn per se rule in Sylvania.515 In adopting this theory, the
Sylvania Court concluded that such restrictions could not be said to
have a "pernicious effect on competition" or to "lack . . . any
redeeming virtue." 516 The Burger majority therefore embraced the
very rationale that the Supreme Court rejected in Topco 517 as a
justification for horizontal resale restrictions. In Sylvania, the Court
discarded the Topco notion of the "inability" of courts "to weigh...
destruction of competition in one sector of the economy against
promotion of competition in another . . .;" 518 a notion that had
prompted the Court to adopt a per se rule for horizontal resale
restrictions in the first place.5 19 No sound reason exists to explain
why courts would be more capable of evaluating the effects on
competition in a Sylvania setting than in a Topco setting. The
question must inevitably arise, therefore: Will the per se rule of
Topco fall next?
C.

Exchange of Price Information

In United States v. Container Corp. of America,5 20 the Warren
Court held that an exchange among competitors of price information
52
concerning specific sales to identified customers was unlawful. 1 It
is difficult to read Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court without
5 22
concluding that this activity was considered to be illegal per se.
Yet, Justice Douglas did not expressly articulate a per se rule, and
Justice Fortas, in a concurring opinion, said that he did not
understand the majority to so hold.5 23 The lower courts have not
considered the exchange of price information among competitors per

515. Id. 58.
516. Id., quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
517. See notes 408-10 & 474-84 and accompanying text supra.

518. 405 U.S. at 609-10; see text accompanying note 475 supra.See also 97 S. Ct. at
2558 n.16.
519. See 405 U.S. at 609-10.
520. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
521. Id. at 336-38.
522. Id. Justice Douglas stated:
The result of this reciprocal exchange of prices was to stabilize prices though
at a downward level. Knowledge of a competitor's price usually meant matching
that price. . . . The limitation or reduction of price competition brings the case
within the ban, for . . .interference with the setting of price by free market
forces is unlawful per se.... The exchange of price data tends toward price
uniformity. . . . The inferences are irresistible that the exchange of price
information has had an anticompetitive effect in the industry, chilling the vigor
of price competition.
Id. at 336-37 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
523. Id. at 338-39 (Fortas, J., concurring).
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se illegal, 52 4 and, in light of its dislike of per se rules, the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Burger will probably not be inclined to do
so either.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 525 a case involving
an exchange of price information, should be decided by the Court
during its 1977 term. The exchanges of prices under scrutiny in
Gypsum were made by manufacturers of gypsum board to verify
price quotations made to customers. 526 The purpose of the exchanges
was ostensibly, to enable the manufacturers to avoid price discriminations that would violate the Robinson-Patman Act amendments
to section 2(a) of the Clayton Act. 527 The district court instructed the
jury that "any purpose was irrelevant so long as the jury found that
verification had a stabilizing effect on price." 528 On appeal to the

Third Circuit, this instruction was held to be reversible error. 52 9 The
court of appeals concluded that Container Corp. had not established
a per se rule for price exchanges that rendered "purpose" irrelevant
in all cases. 530 According to the Third Circuit, Container Corp.
recognized that the purpose behind a price exchange could constitute
a "controlling circumstance," and thereby legitimize an agreement
531
otherwise prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Relying on the principle that, "when policies of the Sherman

and Robinson-Patman Acts conflict, it is the Robinson-Patman Act
that should give way," 532 the Third Circuit in Gypsum fashioned its
53
own narrow "controlling circumstances" exception, holding:
[A]ppellants were entitled to an instruction that their verification practice would not violate the Sherman Act if the jury
found: (1) the appellants engaged in the practice solely to comply
with the strictures of Robinson-Patman; (2) they had first
524. See, e.g., Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 943 (1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
928 (1972); Wall Prod. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
525. 550 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977).
526. 550 F.2d at 120.
527. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976); see 550 F.2d at 120.
528. 550 F.2d at 120-21; see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 383 F.
Supp. 462 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
529. 550 F.2d at 126-27.
530. Id. at 122-23.
531. Id. at 123, quoting United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333,
335 (1969). The "controlling circumstance" language had been used in Container
Corp. to distinguish that case from Cement Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588
(1925). See 393 U.S. at 335. The Third Circuit in Gypsum, concluded that Cement Mfrs.
"approved the exchange of specific price information concerning specific customers,
despite possible effects on prices, where the purpose of the dissemination scheme was
to prevent buyers from defrauding sellers." 550 F.2d at 122, citing Cement Mfrs.
Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
532. 550 F.2d at 125, citing Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
533. 550 F.2d at 126.
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resorted to all other reasonable means of corroboration, without
success; (3) they had good, independent reason to doubt the
buyers' truthfulness; and (4) their communication with competitors was
strictly limited to the one price and one buyer at
4
issue.

53

The fallacy in the court's reasoning is its assumption that price
verification between manufacturers may be necessary to comply
with the strictures of the Robinson-Patman Act. Although that
statute mandates that sellers are not to discriminate in price among
buyers, 535 a seller may discriminate in price "in good faith to meet
an equally low price of a competitor" without violating the
Robinson-Patman Act.5 3 6 This exemption from illegality, however, is

hardly a command to engage in a price-fixing conspiracy violative of
the Sherman Act. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the conspirators
could be discriminating in price in "good faith" in view of the very
existence of their conspiracy. Arguably, a manufacturer, so eager to
sell to a buyer that he secretly offers a price below his list price,
would not be willing to undo his efforts to consummate the sale by
giving the information to his competitor who will use that
information for the sole purpose of "stealing" the sale for himself.
One might even infer, therefore, that the price exchange agreement
is really a conspiracy, not only to stabilize prices, but also to violate
the price discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
There appears to be no reason for the secrecy of the seller's initial
discount offer to the buyer if that offer will be verified to a
competitor. The lower price offer would seem to be secret only to
other purchasers who pay list price, which would evidence something less than good faith on the part of the sellers.
If the Burger Court affirms the Third Circuit's holding in
Gypsum, it will, of course, eviscerate both the Sherman and
Robinson-Patman Acts. However, in view of the Court's antiantitrust bias and its dissatisfaction with the per se approach, it
seems likely that the Court will find some basis on which to affirm.
D. Resale Price Maintenance
In Simpson v.

Union Oil Co., 5 37

the Warren Court found

unlawful an arrangement whereby an oil company set the prices at
which its consignee retailers sold its gasoline to the public.53 8
534. Id.

535. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
536. Id. § 13(b).
537. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).

538. Id. at 16.
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Arguably, this result was consistent with the decision of Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,539 in which the Supreme
Court established the general rule that resale price maintenance in
an outright sale situation was a per se violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.5 4° However, in his dissenting opinion in Simpson,
Justice Stewart lamented the fact that, in effect, the Court was
overruling an earlier decision 541 that had upheld this practice where
there was a bona fide consignment agreement. 542 Although a recent
district court decision has taken Simpson one step further by
declaring resale price maintenance through the use of consignment
agreements per se unlawful,5 43 the viability of distinguishing
between outright sales and consignment agreements to determine
illegality in this area has yet to be considered by the Burger Court.
In Sylvania,544 which involved location restrictions, the Court
concluded "that the distinction drawn in Schwinn between sale and
nonsale transactions is not sufficient to justify the application of a
per se rule in one situation and a rule of reason in the other." 545 The
question, therefore, is whether the Burger Court will find a sufficient
distinction between sale and consignment situations in the area of
resale price maintenance to justify imposing a per se rule on the one
and not on the other. Conceivably, the Court could even follow its
Sylvania example and completely reevaluate the per se rule of Dr.
Miles, but this would probably be too much of a departure from stare
5 46
decisis even for the Burger Court.
E.

Tying Arrangements

The antitrust area in which the Burger Court's retreat from the
"simplified test of illegality" is most likely to have its greatest
impact is that of tying arrangements.5 47 Noting that such arrangements "'serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of

539. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
540. Id. at 408-09.
541. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
542. 377 U.S. at 26-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see United States v. General Elec.
Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926).
543. United'States v. General Elec. Co., 358 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
544. For a discussion of this case, see notes 508-14 and accompanying text supra.
545. 433 U.S. at 57.
546. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In Illinois Brick, the
Court stressed that "we must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh
heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this
Court's interpretation of its legislation." Id. at 736.
547. A tying arrangement has been defined as "an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier." Northern Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (footnote omitted).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

67

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23: p. 213

competition,' ,,548 the Supreme Court declared tying arrangements to
be per se unlawful in Northern Pacific Railway v. United States.5 4 9
The Court in Northern Pacific also stated that the per se rule was
applicable "whenever a party has sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition
in the market for the tied product and a 'not insubstantial' amount
of interstate commerce is affected." 550 Thus, all tying arrangements
are not unlawful; they are unlawful only where the seller has so
much control or dominance in the tying product market that it
possesses an effective weapon with which to pressure buyers into
55 1
taking the tied item.
In an effort to find an unlawful tying arrangement, the Warren
Court tended to "simplify the test" of sufficient economic power. For
example, in Northern Pacific, the Court said that "[t]he very
existence of this host of tying arrangements is itself compelling
evidence of the defendant's great power ... ",552 Similarly, in United
States v. Loew's Inc.,553 the Court held that "the crucial economic
power may be inferred from the tying product's desirability to
consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes. ' 5 4 Moreover, Loew's
determined that, if the tying product is patented or copyrighted, the
"requisite economic power is presumed."5 55 In a portent to its
pronouncement the next year in PNB of the "simplified test of
illegality" for mergers,5 56 the Loew's Court added that in tie-in cases
"it should seldom be necessary . . . to embark upon a full-scale
factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant market for the tying
product and into the corollary problem of the seller's percentage
share in that market." 557 In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp. (Fortner1)558 the Warren Court stated further:
The standard of "sufficient economic power" does not .. .
require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the market for the tying product.
Our tie-in cases have made unmistakably clear that the
548. Id. at 6, quoting Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
305-06 (1949).
549. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).

550.
551.
552.
553.
554.

Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 7-8.
371 U.S. 38 (1962).
Id. at 45.

555. Id. In Northern Pacific, however, the Court stated that "a patent does not
always confer a monopoly over a particular commodity. Often . . . the economic
power resulting from patent privileges is slight." 356 U.S. at 10 n.8.
556. See notes 126-27 and accompanying text supra.
557. 371 U.S. at 45 n.4.
558. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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economic power over the tying product can be sufficient even
though the power falls far short of dominance and even though
the power exists only with respect to some buyers in the
55 9
market.
The Court went on to assert that "the proper focus of concern is
whether the seller has the power . . . to impose . . . burdensome
terms such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of
buyers within the market. ' 560 Clearly, the Court had made tying
arrangements per se unlawful without expressly saying so, for it
made them unlawful if the seller had sufficient power, and the seller
had sufficient power if he could impose a tying arrangement on his
buyers.
The lower courts reacted accordingly. After concluding that a
56 1
trademark license and "know-how" constituted a tying product,
the Ninth Circuit in Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. 562 ruled that the
licensor had sufficient economic power over that tying product to
hold the arrangement unlawful because "the presumption [of
sufficient economic power] that exists in the case of the patent and
copyright . . . [applies] equally ...
to the trademark."5 63 In
Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp.,5 6 4 the
Fifth Circuit held that a manufacturer's designation of a wholesaler
or rebuilder as "authorized" was of sufficient economic value to
constitute a tying product in an unlawful tying arrangement. 56 5
The impact of these lower court decisions was to move tying
arrangements closer to a true per se category, where proof of the
mere existence of a tying arrangement affecting a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce would be sufficient to establish
a violation. Such a position, if adopted, would have a significant
impact not only upon franchising, but also upon the use of "knowhow" licenses to sell unpatented products. For example, a company
selling industrial gases might condition the license of a secret
process that uses an industrial gas upon the purchase of the gas
from the licensor.566 Under a simplified per se test, a plaintiff-licen559. Id. at 502-03.
560. Id. at 504.
561. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48-49 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S 955 (1972).
562. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
563. Id. at 50 (footnote omitted).
564. 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1972).
565. Id. at 1015. See also Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964
(5th Cir. 1977); Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1969).
566. There are also more subtle means of imposing a tying arrangement than by
means of a blatant requirements contract. A licensor could, for example, establish a
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see would not have to prove that the defendant-licensor had
economic power in the "know-how" market. If likened to patents,
56 7
this power could be presumed.
The merger decisions of the Burger Court, however, clearly
indicate the necessity of proving the economic impact of an
anticompetitive practice.5 6 s Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude

that in tying cases the Burger Court will demand proof of economic
power in the tying product market. Indeed, in United States Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. (Fortner II),569 the Court has
already so ruled. Although both the district court and the court of
appeals held that U.S. Steel possessed sufficient economic power to
make the tying arrangement unlawful, 7 the Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that the record did not justify an inference of
571
power.
The Burger Court's willingness in Fortner II to examine the
record and reverse both lower courts on an issue of fact is quite
revealing. Clearly, this is not a Court for whom inferences of
72
anticompetitive effect are irresistible.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The objective of this article has been to demonstrate the antiantitrust bias of the Burger Court through an examination of the
Court's merger decisions during its 1973 and 1974 terms. It is this
author's contention that the Court's propensities in the merger field
will eventually be reflected in many other antitrust areas. A review
of the cases clearly demonstrates how the different philosophies of
the Warren and Burger Courts have worked to produce differing
results, not only in the decisions, but in the law as well.
The question of whether a given merger tends substantially to
lessen competition is ultimately a judgment upon which reasonable
men can differ. The statutory test calls for a prediction of the future.
It asks for a judgment as to probabilities. What the Warren Court
attempted to do was establish a set of guidelines that reduced the
possible range within which the lower courts and the FTC could
royalty for the use of a secret process and then credit the licensee's royalty payments
based upon gas purchases from the licensor. Or the licensor could allow the licensee a
credit in the amount of the royalty to be applied toward the purchase of gas from the
licensor. In either event, the licensor reaps the greater profit in the gas market rather
than in the market for the secret process.
567. See text accompanying note 555 supra.
568. See notes 252-60 & 277-89 and accompanying text supra.
569. 97 S. Ct. 861 (1977); see text accompanying notes 558-60.
570. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 523 F.2d 961,
964-65 (6th Cir. 1975).
571. 97 S. Ct. at 866.
572. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
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exercise individual judgments in individual cases. It is indisputable
that the Warren Court was biased in promulgating rules that
favored findings of illegality. However, it is submitted that a bias in
that direction is much more in keeping with the intent of the
antitrust laws. The Burger Court's rule of reason approach will
inevitably frustrate the effectiveness of the antitrust laws because it
allows imperfect men to decide cases subjectively, without express
standards. The Warren Court gave us rules to apply; the Burger
Court gives us judgments, but no rules. This lack of standards is
essentially the basis for this author's disagreement with the Burger
Court approach. Without rules, judges may indulge their whims and
fancies. The masses, as always, will applaud the decisions that they
like and condemn those that they do not. But our nation was
founded upon the principle that we should have a government of
laws and not of men. The author is concerned that the Burger Court
has given us, if not a government, at least a Court, of men.
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